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I. INTRODUCTION
Debt collectors have an unenviable task. They must zealously pur-
sue delinquent debtors, while being careful not to let their enthusiasm
lead them to excesses. In the past, collectors did not enjoy a sterling
reputation.1 Some of them believed that delinquent debtors wanted to
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
* Tallahassee Alumni Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
1. During the congressional hearings preceding passage of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA"), Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)), one witness summarized her expe-
rience in working for a collection agency:
Since I did not have any prior agency experience, I underwent a short
training period. During this indoctrination, it was suggested to me that
I adopt the attitude that all debtors are liars and thieves, and they
should be treated as such, by insinuation, so to appeal to their moralistic
values. I was to keep in mind that I would be dealing with ignorant
people and I was to use this to my greatest advantage whenever I
could....
I was told that the pride of a good agency collector is the effective use
of scare tactics .... It was not unusual to hear a collector inform the
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evade their responsibilities and that the debt collector's job was to
make sure that the debtors did not succeed in doing so. 2 With this
mindset, some debt collectors were not inhibited in their collection ef-
forts, and there was little state legislation in place to control them.
3
The congressional hearings preceding the enactment of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") exposed the tactics that debt col-
lectors used to achieve their objective. 4 It was not unusual for them to
make telephone calls at all hours of the night, issue threats to the
consumer, or divulge a consumer's confidential information to friends
and neighbors, all in the quest to collect outstanding debts.5 It was
debtor that unless the bill was paid, they would be unable to receive
medical services at any hospital, or that they had better nail their pos-
sessions to the floor before the law came and removed everything they
owned.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R.
5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 37-38 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Patricia A. Miller, Beltsville, Md.).
2. One collector reacted to the proposed federal legislation this way:
We in the collection business deal with delinquent debtors not average
consumers who pay their bills. I respectfully suggest the word consumer
be replaced in the language of this legislation and be changed to delin-
quent debtor.
... [Tihe only class that will benefit from this nobly intended legisla-
tion will be the "deadbeat"-the person who refuses to pay his bills.
Id. at 226, 229 (testimony of Philip Rosenthal, Virginia Collector's Association).
3. The Senate Report on the FDCPA gave a bird's-eye view of the legislation in
place. It indicated:
While 37 states and the District of Columbia do have laws regulating
debt collectors, only a small number are comprehensive statutes which
provide a civil remedy. As an example of ineffective State laws, of the 16
states which regulate by debt collection boards, 12 require by law that a
majority of the board be comprised of debt collectors.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.
4. One witness at the congressional hearings recounted the experience of one of her
clients whose husband had died recently. She reported as follows:
Her husband, Sam, died recently and left her with a stack of bills and
she only had her social security money to pay the bills.
After Sam's death, she got a call from a collection company. The
caller told her if she didn't come up with the money for Sam's funeral, he
would get a court order to dig up Sam's body and repossess the casket.
She didn't know the law. After this she needed medical treatment.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 58-59 (statement of Karen Berger, senior attorney,
Queens Legal Services Corp., New York City).
5. The Senate Report captured the highlights of the collectors' misconduct as
follows:
Collection abuse takes many forms, including obscene or profane lan-
guage, threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, mis-
presentation of a consumer's legal rights, disclosing a consumer's
personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining informa-
tion about a consumer through false pretense, impersonating public offi-
cials and attorneys, and simulating legal process.
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clear that Congress had to do something about these disturbing prac-
tices. In response thereto, it enacted the FDCPA6 in 1977.
The FDCPA defines a debt collector as "any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business
the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."7 One issue that
has bothered courts over the years is the definition of "debt."8 Most
courts have taken the position that a debt need not result from an
extension of credit, 9 but see the necessity of having a consensual
transaction between the parties.iO This Article will examine the judi-
cial approach to the term "debt." Along the same lines, this Article
will examine the specific language in the definition of "debt collector"
that exempts a person from coverage because the debt is obtained
before it is in default."1 This Article will demonstrate that just be-
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696; see
also Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1998).
6. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000).
8. The statute defines "debt" as follows:
The term 'debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a con-
sumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction
are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not
such obligation has been reduced to judgment.
Id. § 1692a(5).
9. See Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 401 (3d Cir. 2000); Romea v.
Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); Ladick v. Van Gemert, 146
F.3d 1205, 1206 (10th Cir. 1998); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (8th
Cir. 1998); Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir.
1997); Charles v. Lundgren & Assocs., P.C., 119 F.3d 739, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1997);
Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1327 (7th
Cir. 1997).
10. See Pollice, 225 F.3d 379 (Water and sewer bills were debts covered under the
FDCPA, but tax bills were not.); Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (The obligation to pay personal property tax did not arise from a transac-
tion and was not a debt.); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustments, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367
(11th Cir. 1998) (Money owed for negligence claim did not arise from a transac-
tion and therefore was not a debt.); Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 32 F.3d 86
(4th Cir. 1994) (Child support payments were not a debt.); Staub v. Harris, 626
F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1980) (The tax was not a debt, because there was no money
exchanged for goods or services).
11. The term "debt collector" does not include "any person collecting or attempting to
collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent
such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was
obtained by such person." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).
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cause a debt is delinquent does not mean that it is in default, although
debt collectors frequently confuse the two situations. 12
Finally, this Article will consider the intricacies of the validation
notice and the problem that a collector faces in trying to give equal
billing to its collection message, while informing the debtor about his
rights to seek verification of the debt.13 One may conclude that the
statute puts the debt collector in an impossible position. This is espe-
cially so in light of the judicial disagreement over the application of
the bona fide error defense to mistakes of law.14
II. DEFINING "DEBT"
Congress has tried to give a clear and comprehensive definition of
terms in the FDCPA. Despite those grand efforts, one cannot help no-
ticing that the definition of "debt" has created difficulties for courts in
determining whether the statute applies in certain transactions. The
definition seems simple enough.15 One early case, Zimmerman v.
HBO Affiliate Group,1 6 seemed to be on the right track when it found
that there was no debt flowing from a demand for payment for televi-
sion signals that were illegally obtained.I7 It was clear that there was
no debt, because the claim arose from a party's tortious conduct rather
than from a consensual transaction.' 8 The Third Circuit was not con-
tent to stop there; instead it went further to point out in dictum that a
transaction must involve an offer or extension of credit. 19
12. See Alibrandi v. Financial Outsourcing Servs., Inc., 333 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003);
Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2003); Kvassay v.
Hasty, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Kan. 2002).
13. The FDCPA requires the debt collector to give certain basic information about the
debt in its first communication with the consumer or within five days thereof.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000). The most troublesome part of the statute relates
to the collector's obligation to inform the consumer that the consumer can dispute
the debt within thirty days after he receives the collector's letter. See id.
§ 1692g(a)(4). The problem is that the collector can continue to press its collec-
tion claim in the same letter, and it frequently calls on the consumer to pay the
debt in less than thirty days. Allowing the collector to do this may confuse the
consumer. The required validation notice has produced many a conflict. See Ren-
ick v. Dun & Bradstreet Receivable Mgmt. Servs., 290 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2002);
DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001); Bartlett v. Heibl,
128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S. 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
14. The FDCPA provides: "A debt collector may not be held liable in any action... if
the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was
not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the mainte-
nance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(c) (2000).
15. See id. § 1692a(5).
16. 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987).
17. Id. at 1168.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 1168-69.
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What was the justification for this? The court was led astray by
the fact that the FDCPA was part of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act ("CCPA").20 It seemed reasonable to the court that a transaction
should be understood to have some relationship to credit in light of the
FDCPA's statutory context. 2 1 The court's confidence about this aspect
seemed misplaced, for another statute that had nothing to do with
credit also found its way into the CCPA. The Electronic Fund Trans-
fer Act ("EFTA")22 was simply another of those statutes that Congress
enacted as part of the CCPA, with the objective of protecting consum-
ers across the board from abusive consumer transactions.23 In some
cases it was credit,2 4 in others it was the collection of debts.25 It is
understandable that the Zimmerman court may have been led astray
by the CCPA's title, which, taken by itself, gives the impression that
credit is an essential element of the legislation. Had the court taken a
hard look at the various parts of the CCPA, it would have noticed the
differences in congressional purpose behind the enactments. For ex-
ample, the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA")26 was intended to "assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms,"2 7 while the FDCPA was geared
toward eliminating "abusive debt collection practices by debt collec-
tors."28 Therefore, although the CCPA's original focus may have been
on credit-related transactions, 29 that is no longer the case. Its reach is
broader than that, because Congress wanted to extend protection to
other transactions that were unrelated to the extension of credit, but
that were nevertheless subject to abuse in the marketplace.30
20. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1693r (2000)).
21. See Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168-69.
22. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1693-1693r (2000)).
23. The EFTA expresses its basic purpose as follows: "It is the purpose of this sub-
chapter to provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and re-
sponsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems. The primary
objective of this subchapter, however, is the provision of individual consumer
rights." 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (2000)).
24. See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 101-145, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (2000)).
25. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)).
26. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1666j (2000)).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
28. Id. § 1692(e).
29. The first three titles of the original CCPA were headed: Consumer Credit Cost
Disclosure (Title I), Extortionate Credit Transactions (Title II), and Restriction
on Garnishment (Title III). See Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000)).
30. For example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat.
874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)), and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified
[Vol. 83:762
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There was nothing that compelled the court in Zimmerman to em-
phasize the absence of the credit element, for it was already on solid
ground in rejecting the application of the FDCPA to a tortious transac-
tion relating to the misuse of television signals. 3 1 Although the stat-
ute covers any obligation to pay money in consumer transactions, the
court wanted to restrict its application to transactions involving an
extension of credit. The Zimmerman court was therefore not satisfied
with the plain meaning of the statute.3 2 It was left to the Seventh
Circuit in Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C.33 to
set the record straight by giving the statutory language its ordinary
meaning. A consumer's obligation to pay, therefore, was not restricted
to credit-related transactions. 3 4 Even if it was arguable that the defi-
nition of "debt" was so unclear that the court needed some help from
the FDCPA's legislative history, reference to that source only served
to strengthen the court's position that Congress did not intend to re-
strict the statute to such transactions. 35 While early versions of the
FDCPA did contain some reference to the extension of credit, 36 the
final version lacked any such reference in the definition of "debt." The
committee report revealed the statutory intent that the term "debt"
should include "consumer obligations paid by check or other non-
credit consumer obligations." 3 7
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2000)), were enacted after the original
Consumer Credit Protection Act was passed in 1968.
31. In Zimmerman, the court identified the kind of transaction that might produce a
debt. It was a 'transaction in which a consumer is offered or extended the right
to acquire 'money, property, insurance, or services' which are 'primarily for
household purposes' and to defer payment." 834 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (3d Cir.
1987). One searches in vain for any statutory reference to deferral of payment in
§ 1692a(5).
32. "A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). It has also been stated that
"when the language of the statute is clear and not unreasonable or illogical in its
operation, the court may not go outside the statute to give it a different meaning."
2A NoRmAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01 (6th ed.
2000).
33. 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997).
34. See id. at 1326.
35. See id.
36. The definition in H.R. 13,720 was as follows: "The term 'debt' means any obliga-
tion arising out of a transaction in which credit is offered or extended to an indi-
vidual, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1202, at 13 (1976).
37. H.R. REP. No. 95-131, at 4 (1977). The report gave as an example of a noncredit
consumer obligation a "doctor, dentist or hospital bill that is originally expected
to be paid in full in one payment within 30 days, and then either becomes overdue
or is subsequently paid in partial payments." Id.
2005]
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After Bass, other circuits joined the Seventh Circuit in rejecting
the Zimmerman dictum.3 S When the Third Circuit itself returned to
the issue in Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P.,39 it expressed its
dissatisfaction with Zimmerman and clarified once and for all that no
extension of credit was necessary for the creation of a debt. The rele-
vant consideration was whether there was an obligation to pay that
arose from a consensual consumer transaction. 40
Although the element of credit no longer played any role in the
definition of "debt," queries still remained about the kind of transac-
tion that satisfied the definition. The Zimmerman court recognized
the requirement of an underlying consensual exchange for the FDCPA
to apply.4 1 The question that continued to confront the courts was
whether any obligation that resulted from a consensual arrangement
constituted a debt. In Bass, the collector tried to recover on a dishon-
ored check.42 The debt collector did not limit its defense to the credit-
related element, but argued for the exclusion of dishonored checks
from the definition of "debt" on the ground that the tender of a worth-
less check was a criminal act.43 This seemed to be a sweeping gener-
alization, for as the court pointed out, dishonored checks do not result
only from transactions where the consumer intends to defraud the
payee.44 Congress was convinced that most defaulting debtors intend
to honor their obligations, and that most delinquencies flow from un-
foreseen and unpredictable circumstances. 45 Even though some de-
faulting debtors do not deserve protection because of their fraudulent
motives, there is no evidence that Congress intended to make the
FDCPA inapplicable when debt collectors try to collect on the dishon-
ored checks of such debtors.46 The FDCPA was intended to curb abu-
sive collection practices, and the relevant question is whether the
38. See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 114 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998); Duffy v.
Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997); Charles v. Lundgren & Assocs., P.C.,
119 F.3d 739, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1997).
39. 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000).
40. Id. at 401-02.
41. See 834 F.2d 1163, 1168 (3d Cir. 1987).
42. 111 F.3d 1322, 1323 (7th Cir. 1997).
43. Id. at 1329.
44. Id.
45. The Senate Report on the FDCPA indicated as follows: "One of the most frequent
fallacies concerning debt collection legislation is the contention that the primary
beneficiaries are 'deadbeats.' In fact, however, there is universal agreement
among scholars, law enforcement officials, and even debt collectors that the num-
ber of persons who willfully refuse to pay just debts is minuscule." S. REP. No.
95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.
46. The Bass court recognized that "[nlo section of the [FDCPA] requires an inquiry
into the worthiness of the debtor, or purports to protect only 'deserving' debtors."
111 F.3d at 1330. A congressional report has previously weighed in on the issue
of bad checks as follows:
[Vol. 83:762
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consumer gave the check in payment of a consumer obligation. It is no
secret that a check represents the drawer's obligation to pay for his
purchases and even if the check is dishonored, that obligation still re-
mains.47 The dishonor of the check does not affect the underlying
transaction.
The defendant in Bass had hoped that the court would recognize an
exception for fraud in deciding whether a dishonored check could be
included in the definition of "debt."48 The court was unwilling to ac-
cept the proposition that all dishonored checks relate to fraudulent
transactions, and that the exception could be sustained on that basis
alone.49 Congress must have known that not all checks given in con-
sumer transactions would be paid on presentment, but this possibility
did not affect the consumer's obligation to pay money arising out of
that transaction.50 This means, therefore, that the FDCPA protects
an intentional defaulter, because the obligation represented by the
dishonored check comes within the definition of "debt," and the stat-
ute therefore sanctions the errant collector in such cases. This aspect
of the statute is not as alarming as it appears, since the statute's basic
objective is to prevent abuse in the collection process, and not to con-
trol the underlying transaction between the parties.5 1
The definition of "debt" has come into question in other contexts.
In the case of child support obligations, it is generally accepted that
Opponents of this legislation claim that, regardless of the amount of
consumer harassment or deception, there should be no legislation be-
cause the number of unpaid bills and bad checks keeps increasing. This
reasoning is misleading. The issue is not one of uncollected debts, but
rather whether or not consumers must lose their civil rights and be ter-
rorized and abused by unethical debt collectors.
H.R. REP. No. 95-131, at 3 (1977).
47. See U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(1) (2004); HAROLD WEISBLATT, BANKING LAW § 121.03[1], at
121-11 (2001).
48. See 111 F.3d at 1329.
49. The court recognized that "an issuer whose intention not to pay the check arises
only at some point after it is issued has still not, in most jurisdictions, committed
a fraudulent or criminal act." Id.
50. Relying on the findings of the National Commission on Consumer Finance, the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs pointed out that "the
vast majority of consumers who obtain credit fully intend to repay their debts.
When default occurs, it is nearly always due to an unforeseen event such as un-
employment, overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties or divorce." S.
REP. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697. This
suggests that there are some consumers who do not intend to repay their debt.
Nevertheless, the FDCPA does not deny its protection to people in that category.
After all, the thrust of the legislation is to "eliminate abusive debt collection prac-
tices." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000).
51. The FDCPA reflects its purpose as follows: "It is the purpose of this subchapter to
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those
debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect
consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
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there is no "debt," because the obligor does not incur an obligation to
pay in order to receive any goods or services for himself.5 2 It is true
that the money which the child receives may be used for personal or
household purposes, but the issue is whether the payor receives any
"money, property, insurance, or services" primarily for such pur-
poses. 53 The function of an agreement for support is to ensure that
the parent will take care of the child, and not for the parent to secure
any additional benefit for himself. Therefore, there is nothing in that
arrangement that satisfies the requirement that the parent must ob-
tain something for personal or household purposes in exchange for his
obligation to pay support. The focus must be on the obligor-consumer,
and not on the way that the obligee uses the proceeds that flow from
the support payments. The same thing may be said about an obliga-
tion to pay arising out of a divorce agreement. The promise to pay
does not require any property or services from the other side that can
give rise to a true consensual transaction. 54
In the case of condominium or homeowner association fees, the
consumer's obligation to pay arises out of the purchase transaction.55
It does not matter that a consumer must pay his assessments even
before the condominium association actually provides any goods or
services.5 6 There is no doubt that the property which is the subject of
the transaction must be for "personal, family, or household pur-
poses."5 7 The assessments themselves qualify for those purposes, be-
cause they are used for the maintenance of the common areas of the
52. See Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 32 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1994); Raffaele v. Mar-
rama, 164 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Mass. 2001); Campbell v. Baldwin, 90 F. Supp. 2d
754 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Brown v. Child Support Advocates, 878 F. Supp. 1451 (D.
Utah 1994); Battye v. Child Support Servs., Inc. 873 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
Wayne Hill, Annotation, What Constitutes "Debt" for Purposes of Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(5)), 159 A.L.R. FED. 121 (2000).
53. A parent does not incur an obligation to support his child in order to receive con-
sumer goods or services. Therefore, there is no "debt" under these circumstances.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2000); Mabe, 32 F.3d at 88. A parent does not incur the
obligation because he is a consumer, and the obligation does not arise because of
a "transaction." Battye, 873 F. Supp. at 105. "[His obligation to support his chil-
dren exists simply because his children exist." Id.
54. See Hicken v. Arnold, Anderson & Dove, P.L.L.P., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Minn.
2001). The court explained its position this way:
[T]he dissolution of a marriage, with all of its attendant negotiations, is
simply not a transaction between consumers. [The] property settlement
obligations under the terms of the divorce decree did not arise out of a
consensual consumer obligation ... and therefore does not implicate a
"transaction" within the meaning of the FDCPA.
Id. at 1143.
55. See Ladick v. Van Gemert, 146 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1998).
56. See Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Ltd., 119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
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property.5 8 These assessments must be contrasted with a consumer's
tax obligations, which are not considered debts under the FDCPA.59
The court in Staub v. Harris60 recognized that taxes are "public
burdens imposed generally upon the inhabitants of the whole state, or
upon some civil division thereof, for governmental purposes, without
reference to peculiar benefits to particular individuals or property."6 '
They do not arise, therefore, from a transaction in which the govern-
mental services are for "personal, family, or household purposes."
6 2
There is no limit on the government's authority to use such taxes for
broader, societal purposes such as construction, defense, court sys-
tems, and other public projects.6 3 The court in Staub could not dis-
cern the kind of pro tanto exchange between the taxing authority and
the consumer that the statute contemplated. 6 4 The court was looking
at least for some connection between the consumer's obligation and
the rendition of a service that would bring the transaction within the
definition of "debt."65
The court in Staub dealt with a per capita tax, but the result is not
any different in the case of a property tax. In Beggs v. Rossi,6 6 a debt
collector tried to collect on a personal property tax levied on the con-
sumer's car, and the Second Circuit came to the same conclusion as
the Third Circuit in Staub. The tax was not imposed on the purchase
of the car, but rather on the ownership thereof, and so the court could
find no transaction that would make the statute applicable. 67
58. See Ladick, 146 F.3d 1205; Fuller v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., 192 F. Supp. 2d
1361 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Thies v. Law Offices of William A. Wyman, 969 F. Supp.
604 (S.D. Cal. 1997); see also Dorsey v. Morgan, 760 F. Supp. 509 (D. Md. 1991)
(campground membership obligation is a debt under FDCPA).
59. See Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1998); Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 (3d
Cir. 1980); Mathis v. United States ex rel. Comm'r, No. CIV 02-4087, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6240 (D. S.D. Mar. 19, 2003).
60. 626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 278 (BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1307 (5th ed. 1979)).
62. The FDCPA applies to "debts contracted by consumers for personal, family, or
household purposes," S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.
63. See Staub, 626 F.2d at 278.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. 145 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1998).
67. Id. at 512. The plaintiffs in Beggs tried to distinguish their case from Staub by
suggesting that the property tax was a transaction-based tax like a stamp tax or
tobacco tax. Id. The court pointed out, however, that the tax was levied on the
ownership of the vehicle rather than on the purchase thereof. Id. The Third Cir-
cuit gave a similar explanation in Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d
379 (3d Cir. 2001), when it observed that "[u]nlike a sales tax,... which arguably
arises from the sale transaction, the property taxes [in Pollice] arose not from the
purchase of property but from the fact of ownership." Id. at 402. The Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") has concluded that the term "debt" does not include
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The prevailing inquiry in these cases is whether the consumer's
obligation to pay arises out of a consensual transaction, and also
whether the "money, property, insurance, or services which are the
subject of the transaction" are primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes. In the condominium assessment cases, the courts gen-
erally recognize the presence of both elements.68 In other contexts,
sometimes one element is satisfied and the other is not. For example,
in Berman v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership,69 the consumer argued
that the unemployment insurance contributions that the debt collector
tried to recover from him constituted a debt under the statute. The
court agreed that the consumer's obligation to make such contribu-
tions derived from the employment of an individual, thus satisfying
the requirement that the consumer must have an obligation to pay
money arising out of a transaction. 70 But the contributions did not
produce any money, insurance, or services for the consumer's personal
benefit. 7 1 Like the taxes in Staub, the state benefits accruing from
the unemployment insurance contributions were conferred on eligible
residents throughout the state. 72 There was no way of showing that
the State gave the consumer anything in return other than the satis-
faction of helping unemployed workers as a whole.73 Contributors do
not stand to gain individual benefits from the insurance requirement,
for the statute is intended to serve a more general purpose than the
FDCPA requires. 74 Although the consumer in Berman managed to
overcome the transaction hurdle and thus was in better shape than
the consumer in Staub, they both failed on the second round to show
"[u]npaid taxes." FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,102 (Dec. 13,
1988). In publishing the Commentary, the FTC explained as follows:
This Commentary is the vehicle by which the staff of the Federal
Trade Commission publishes its interpretations of the Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act (FDCPA). It is a guideline intended to clarify the staff
interpretations of the statute, but does not have the force or effect of
statutory provisions. It is not a formal trade regulation rule or advisory
opinion of the Commission, and thus is not binding on the Commission
or the public.
Id. at 50,101.
68. See Ladick v. Van Gemert, 146 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1998); Newman v. Boehm,
Pearlstein & Bright, Ltd., 119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Mount Oak
Manor Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 753 (D. Md. 1998); Thies v. Law
Offices of William A. Wyman, 969 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
69. 146 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1998).
70. Id. at 486.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The court recognized that "the contributors receive only a general, public benefit
similar to that associated with the payment of taxes." Id.
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that the tax or the insurance contributions inured to the benefit of the
taxpayer or the contributing employer. 7 5
Sometimes it is difficult to decipher whether the obligation to pay
is too far removed from the original transaction to satisfy the defini-
tion of "debt." In Hamilton v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc.,76
the consumer was covered under an insurance policy that required
him to reimburse the insurer for duplicate payments received from
another company for the same coverage. The court observed that the
consumer's obligation to pay arose from the consumer's purchase of
insurance.7 7 This was the transaction that produced that obligation.
But was the court's observation correct?
The definition of "debt" dictates that the consumer must have an
obligation to pay "arising out of' a transaction.7 8 When the obligation
is to pay premiums for insurance coverage for personal, family, or
household purposes, there is little doubt that the FDCPA covers any
resulting debt.79 When the insurer asserts a subrogation claim pursu-
ant to its policy provisions and then reminds the consumer of his obli-
gation to reimburse the insurer, the original transaction becomes a
little distant, and an observer may find it hard to make the connection
between it and the consumer's obligation to pay. This was the point
that bothered dissenting Judge Garza in Hamilton.8 0 He was afraid
that the court had gone too far with its expansive interpretation of the
phrase "arising out of."81 Courts are accustomed to dealing with situ-
75. In Staub, there was no consensual transaction and the taxes were not "primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes." 626 F.2d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 1980). In
Berman, there was a consensual transaction involving the hiring of an employee,
but the insurance contributions could not satisfy the "purpose" requirement. 146
F.3d at 487.
76. 310 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2002).
77. Id. at 392. The defendant in Hamilton had hoped to gain some advantage from
the ruling in Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1998),
when the Eleventh Circuit held that the consumer's obligation was not related to
a consumer transaction, because the defendant was attempting to enforce subro-
gation rights arising out of an automobile accident. Unlike Hawthorne, the obli-
gation to pay in Hamilton did not arise from a tortious act. The consumer in
Hawthorne found herself obligated because of her negligence; there was no ele-
ment of a consumer transaction.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2000).
79. See Correa v. Rowley, No. 97-0903, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18412 (E.D. La. Nov.
13, 1997); Stewart v. Salzman, No. N-87-319, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16865 (D.
Conn. Nov. 2, 1987).
80. See 310 F.3d at 394 (Garza, J., dissenting).
81. Judge Garza explained his position:
The subrogation claim asserted by United arose out of a string of events.
First, there was the insurance contract between United and Hamilton.
Second, there was the contract for uninsured and/or underinsured mo-
torist coverage.., between Hamilton and State Farm. Third, there was
the accident that injured Hamilton. Fourth, there was United's payment
of Hamilton's medical bills. Fifth, there was the payment by State Farm
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ations where the consumer's obligation arises out of a single transac-
tion.8 2 This is not surprising, since it is much easier to show a
correlation between the consumer's obligation to pay money and the
central transaction between the parties.
The situation is more complicated, however, once the parties move
beyond the original arrangement. If the consumer pays for goods with
an invalid check, there is little disagreement that what a collector
tries to recover is indeed a "debt."83 The consumer's obligation to pay
for the goods is not diminished by the check's dishonor.84 A similar
relationship exists when a consumer arranges for insurance coverage
with his insurance company. In that event, the consumer's obligation
to pay his premium truly arises out of the transaction with the insurer
from which the consumer expects insurance for personal, family, or
household purposes.8 5 The transition from the original agreement for
coverage to the finer details of subrogation puts some tension on the
"arising out of' phrase. One argument in favor of finding that a debt
exists is that there would be no dispute if the parties did not have a
transaction involving insurance. Therefore, any problem that results
therefrom surely arises out of the transaction.8 6 It is not as if the dis-
pute between the parties is an isolated matter that stands on its own,
without any relationship at all to the insurance agreement. In this
sense, therefore, there is some support for giving the statutory lan-
guage an expansive reading, since the matter to be resolved is inti-
mately bound up with the insurance coverage and the consumer's
corresponding obligation to pay. The "arising out of' phraseology
gives wider scope to the statute, for then the obligation need not be
to Hamilton pursuant to the UM policy. So, although one might say that
this subrogation claim arose out of the underlying insurance agreement
between United and Hamilton, one could also say that the claim arose
out of any one of these other events.
Id. at 394-95.
82. See Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000) (obligation to
pay for water and sewer service); Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111 (2d
Cir. 1998) (obligation for back rent); Ladick v. Van Gemert, 146 F.3d 1205 (10th
Cir. 1998) (obligation to pay homeowner association dues); Snow v. Jesse L. Rid-
dle, P.C., 143 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1998) (obligation to pay on dishonored check).
83. See Snow v. Jesse L. Riddle P.C., 143 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1998); Duffy v. Land-
berg, 133 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 1998); Charles v. Lundgren & Assocs., P.C., 119
F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1997); Gradisher v. Check Enforcement Unit, Inc., 133 F. Supp.
2d 988 (W.D. Mich. 2001). But see Krevsky v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 479 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
84. See Duffy, 133 F.3d at 1123; Charles, 119 F.3d at 742; Bass v. Stolper, Koritzin-
sky, Brewster & Neider S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1324 (7th Cir. 1997). When an un-
certified check is taken for an obligation, the obligation is suspended until the
check is dishonored, paid or certified. If the check is dishonored, the obligee may
enforce either the instrument or the obligation. See U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(3) (2004).
85. See Hamilton, 310 F.3d at 392.
86. See id.
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restricted to the initial exchange between the parties.8 7 If Congress
had intended to limit the definition of "debt" to the consumer's obliga-
tion to pay the insurance premiums, it could have said simply that
such an obligation referred to payment for obtaining "money, prop-
erty, insurance, or services," instead of requiring the obligation to
arise out of a transaction relating to such matters.8 8 There is no need
to ignore the plain meaning of the statute, particularly when Congress
has expressed a strong desire to regulate unfair collection practices.8 9
III. THE MEANING OF "DEFAULT" IN THE DEFINITION OF
"DEBT COLLECTOR"
After defining the term "debt collector,"90 the FDCPA lists some
activities that are excluded from the definition. 9 1 Thus, a person is
not a debt collector if that person's activity concerns a debt which is
not in default when the person obtains it.92 The statute does not de-
fine the term "default," and so the courts must decide when a default
occurs for purposes of categorizing someone as a debt collector.
The time of default is not merely an academic exercise. In Bailey v.
Security National Servicing Corp. ,93 the debtors defaulted under their
original mortgage agreement and their loan was assigned to the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The debtors
and HUD then entered into a series of forbearance agreements for the
debtors to bring their loan current.9 4 Although the original loan re-
87. It has been said that the meaning of the words "arising out of" is understood as
"'originating from' or 'having its origin in,' 'growing out of or 'flowing from.'"
Schmidt v. Utils. Ins. Co., 182 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. 1944); see also Hamilton, 310
F.3d at 391.
88. The Hamilton court said that "the plain meaning of 'arising out of as 'stemming
from' leads [the court] to conclude that the obligation to pay arose from the con-
tract/transaction for insurance." 310 F.3d at 392.
89. The FDCPA was intended to be broadly remedial. The Senate report gave the
legislative thrust: "[The] bill prohibits in general terms any harassing, unfair, or
deceptive collection practice. This will enable the courts, where appropriate, to
proscribe other improper conduct which is not specifically addressed." S. REP.
No. 95-382, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698; see also NAT'L CON-
SUMER LAw CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION § 3.2.1, at 62 (5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION] (stating that language of the act is to be construed by
plain meaning).
90. The FDCPA provides as follows:
The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or as-
serted to be owed or due another.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000).
91. See id. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F).
92. See id. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).
93. 154 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 386.
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mained in default, the forbearance agreement superseded it for the
time being, and the loan was subsequently sold to a third party.9 5
When the loan servicer sent out a letter listing the next four payments
due, it cautioned the debtors that if they did not make their payments
under the forbearance agreement, the agreement would be null and
void and their note would be accelerated.96
When the debtors sued the servicer for not complying with the
FDCPA, the servicer responded that it was not subject to the statute
because it was not a debt collector. 97 The court had to decide whether
the servicer was trying to collect a debt that was in default. When the
servicer obtained the debt, it was no longer in arrears, because the
forbearance agreement had temporarily replaced the original mort-
gage agreement and the debtors were not then in default in light of
the forbearance.98 The forbearance agreement was the subject of the
servicer's letter, and therefore there was no default when the servicer
acted to reassure the debtors of the new terms. 99 This was an exam-
ple, therefore, of a new agreement superseding a defaulted agreement,
thus giving a debtor another opportunity to restore his creditworthi-
ness under a new plan.lOO
Other cases dealing with the default issue have not ended happily
for the debt collector. In Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.,1O1 the
debt collector sent the debtors a letter indicating that the debt was in
default, but failed to comply with the requirements of the FDCPA. 102
As it turned out, the consumers were not in default, and Fairbanks
argued that the statute did not apply because it was not a debt
collector.103
Like the debt in Bailey, the debt in Schlosser was not actually in
default. Nevertheless, Fairbanks assumed that there was a default
95. Id at 386.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 386-87.
98. Id. at 388.
99. The court observed that "[clommon sense and the plain meaning of the statute
require that we distinguish between an individual who comes collecting on a de-
faulted debt and one who seeks collection on a debt owed under a brand new
payment plan, or forbearance agreement that is current." Id. at 387.
100. The servicer's letter specifically noted that the plaintiffs owed the debt under the
"'forbearance agreement,'" not the original note, and that the servicer wanted to
work with the plaintiffs in making payment "'under [that] agreement.'" Id. at
387.
101. 323 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2003).
102. The collection letter did not advise the debtors that they had a right to dispute
the debt in writing. Id. at 536.
103. Fairbanks argued that it could not be a debt collector because the loan was not
actually in default when Fairbanks obtained it. Id. Fairbanks wanted the court
to look at the real state of affairs.
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and sent out its collection letter on that basis.1 0 4 The question was,
therefore, whether Fairbanks's activities excluded Fairbanks from the
"debt collector" designation because the loan was not actually in de-
fault when Fairbanks acquired it.105 It was all a mistake, and the
statutory exclusion seemed to apply to the debt.
The court did not accept the plain meaning approach to the inter-
pretation of the statutory language, because it would have led to an
unreasonable result. 10 6 Had it not looked for an alternative interpre-
tation, it would have agreed that a debt collector could avoid any stat-
utory obligation if it made a mistake about the status of the debt.1o7
For example, a collector would get itself in trouble for not giving a
validation notice only if it was not mistaken about the debt. In order
to make sense of the statute, the court focused on the collector's activ-
ity in attempting to collect the debt "asserted to be owed."1OS The rele-
104. When Fairbanks acquired the mortgage from ContiMortgage, the mortgage
records showed that it was delinquent. There was no reason for Fairbanks to
think otherwise. Fairbanks identified itself to the debtors as a debt collector. See
id. at 535. The collection letter started off with spectacular language: "DEMAND
LETTER-YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME!" Id.
105. A person is not a debt collector if that person's activity "concerns a debt which
was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2000).
106. Schlosser, 323 F.3d at 537-38. The courts have not been reluctant to ignore the
plain meaning rule if the statutory language leads to an unreasonable result.
The Supreme Court has led the way: "Where the literal reading of a statutory
term would 'compel an odd result,' . . . we must search for other evidence of con-
gressional intent to lend the term its proper scope." Public Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)). Writing for the court in Cabell v. Markham,
148 F.2d 737, 739 (1945), Judge Learned Hand explained why courts are not tied
to a literal interpretation of language:
[Ilt is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the pri-
mary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the mean-
ing of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is
one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes al-
ways have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
Id. at 739.
107. The court in Schlosser identified the problem as follows:
So those like Fairbanks that obtain a mix of loans, only some of which
are in default, would be subject to the FDCPA if they fail to provide the
required notice of the mechanism for correcting mistakes when they at-
tempt to collect a loan they assert is in default-but only as to those
loans about which they are not mistaken.
323 F.3d at 537.
108. The relevant status is that of the "asserted debt" that the person is trying to
collect. See id. at 538 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)). It does not matter, there-
fore, that the debt is not actually owed. See Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170,
1178 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding debt collectors liable for unfair collection practices
regardless of validity of debt); McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47-48
(5th Cir. 1992) (FDCPA action does not depend on the validity of a debt.); Baker
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vant status was that of the asserted debt that Fairbanks was trying to
collect.10 9 Fairbanks alleged that the debt was in default as a basis
for its collection activity. This was the defining moment. If the loan
was current at the time of the assignment, the relationship between
the assignee and the debtor mirrored that which existed between the
debtor and the original lender.
Everything will run smoothly once the consumer makes her pay-
ments. Once the consumer defaults, however, and a third party steps
in to ensure collection of the debt, the only activity will be pursuit of
the defaulting debtor. The change in the relationship between the
parties brings the FDCPA into operation, and the statute must then
control the collector's conduct. If the debt collector is mistaken about
the status of the debt, it will matter little, because its intent is to re-
cover the debt.11o When it later turns out that there was no actual
default, the collector will have already ignored the statute and vio-
lated the consumer's rights. It would be senseless, therefore, to ab-
solve the debt collector of its own delinquency because of the mistaken
assertions.ll The Schlosser court was on solid ground in rejecting the
application of the exception in § 1692a(6)(F)(iii),112 since the collector
attempted to collect on a debt that it asserted to be in default, and that
asserted default existed when the collector acquired the debt.
v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that "debtor has
standing to complain of violations of [FDCPA], regardless of whether a valid debt
exists").
109. The activity relating to a debt "asserted to be owed," 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F),
must be read together with the consumer's "alleged obligation," id. § 1692a(5).
This language suggests that a person's activities may fall within the statute even
though the debt is not actually owed. See FAIR DEBT COLLECTION, supra note 89,
§ 4.3.10, at 101.
110. In that event, the person who is trying to collect cannot be regarded as a creditor,
because he received an assignment of the debt for the purpose of facilitating col-
lection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). The debt would mean the "alleged obligation of
[the] consumer," id. § 1692a(5), which the collector has treated as being in de-
fault. See also Schlosser, 323 F.3d at 538-39 (holding a company to be a "debt
collector" and not a "creditor" concerning a mortgage not actually in default when
it was acquired, because the company asserted that the debt was in default from
the time it was acquired).
111. The broad reach of the FDCPA can be seen in the section prohibiting harassment
or abuse. The "collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence
of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collec-
tion of a debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2000). The language does not restrict the
cause of action to the debtor and the debt may be an "alleged obligation," rather
than an actual obligation. Id. § 1692a(5). The language of the statute recognizes
that a cause of action should not rest on the validity of the debt.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (excluding from the term "debt collector," "any person
collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in
default at the time it was obtained by such person").
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The confusion about when a default occurs can arise in other con-
texts. In Alibrandi v. Financial Outsourcing Services, Inc,x1 3 an auto-
mobile lessor concluded that the lessee owed a debt for excess wear
and tear on the vehicle. It hired a collector to recover the debt, and
the collector.sent a collection letter to the lessee containing the usual
FDCPA disclosures.' 14 A little later, the lessor shifted the assignment
to another firm, Financial Outsourcing, and its agreement stipulated
that the lessor did not consider the account to be delinquent. 1 15 Fi-
nancial Outsourcing was to act as a "service provider" and not as a
collection agency in trying to recover the debt.116 When Financial
Outsourcing wrote to the lessee, it assured the latter that his account
was not in default, and it even referred to the debt as a "deficiency
balance."117 There was no hint of collection language in the letter to
the lessee, no threats, and no reminder of consequences to flow from
the consumer's delinquency.118 After all, Financial Outsourcing was
only "servicing" the account. 119 Nevertheless, the consumer alleged
that the so-called servicer had violated the FDCPA by not including
113. 333 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).
114. Id. at 83.
115. The agreement between First Union, the lessor, and Financial Outsourcing pro-
vided in pertinent part:
First Union National Bank does not consider these accounts delinquent.
Financial [Outsourcing] shall act as a service provider and not a collec-
tion agency when handling these accounts. Financial [Outsourcing]
shall not make numerous phone calls at early or late hours nor send
numerous letters to such customers. All form letters must be preap-
proved by First Union.
Id. at 84. The reference to "numerous phone calls," is interesting. It serves as a
reminder of the need for the FDCPA. The Senate Report on the FDCPA re-
counted the evidence of"telephone calls at unreasonable hours." S. REP. No. 95-
382, at 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
116. Alibrandi, 333 F.3d at 84.
117. Id. Financial Outsourcing did its best to bill itself as a "servicer" rather than a
"collector." Id. It reassured the lessee that his account was not in default. Id.
118. The language in Financial Outsourcing's letter was too polite to fall into the col-
lection category. Compare id. ("Your account is not in default .... Please remit
payment using the enclosed envelope.... Should you have any questions, please
contact our office, toll-free, . . .as our staff is prepared to assist you.'"), with
Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 483 (4th Cir. 1991)
("'YOUR SERIOUSLY PAST DUE ACCOUNT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO US FOR
IMMEDIATE ACTION. YOU HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO PAY YOUR DEBT,
BUT YOU HAVE NOT. IF THERE IS A VALID REASON, PHONE US AT [tele-
phone number] TODAY. IF NOT, PAY US-NOW.'" The bottom third of the
letter was taken up almost completely by the word "NOW."), and Gradisher v.
Check Enforcement Unit, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 907, 916 (W.D. Mich. 2002) ("'Va-
rious PENAL CODES ALLOW FOR CRIMINAL PROSECTUION when a person
KNOWLINGLY writes a bad check(s).... We may proceed to file your check with
local law enforcement.'").
119. If Financial Outsourcing had been "collecting" rather than "servicing" the debt, it
would have had to give the FDCPA warnings. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
77920051
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the required warnings in its letter, since the servicer, Financial Out-
sourcing, had obtained the debt after default.120
The Alibrandi court refused to accept the consumer's argument
that a default occurred immediately after payment was due.12 1 Rec-
ognizing the congressional silence about the definition of "default," the
court was prepared to allow the parties themselves to resolve the issue
through their contractual arrangements. 12 2 That was not the end of
the matter. In the original letter to the consumer, the correspondent,
North Shore, had identified itself as a debt collector, advising the con-
sumer-lessee that "'[s]erious collection of [his] account . . . [began]
with [the] letter.'"123 This seemed to be an acknowledgment that the
debt was in default, and that North Shore was trying to collect it.124
The lessor's subsequent agreement with another party could not
change the effect of the previous default, pursuant to which North
Shore had acted.125 Financial Outsourcing's ignorance of the prior ar-
rangement between the lessor and North Shore could not change the
status of the debt when Financial Outsourcing took on the assign-
ment. 126 Unlike Schlosser, the debt here was actually in default, and
it mattered not that the subsequent party had changed the focus from
collection to servicing of the debt.
One could be sympathetic towards Financial Outsourcing in this
context. The agreement with the lessor, First Union National Bank,
had specifically denied that the accounts were delinquent.127 Fur-
thermore, Financial Outsourcing was to act as a service provider and
not a collection agency. 1 28 If the accounts were not paid within 120
days, First Union was going to assign them to a collection agency for
120. Alibrandi, 333 F.3d at 84.
121. Id. at 87.
122. Id. at 87 n.5.
123. Id. at 83.
124. This letter from North Shore contained all the collection warnings required by
the FDCPA. Id. Among them was the validation notice dictated by § 1692g(a).
125. On this point, the court concluded that "[t]he status of the debt would not have
been alterable by the expedient of a letter agreement between First Union and
Financial Outsourcing." Alibrandi, 333 F.3d at 88. In its 2001 annual report to
Congress, the FTC recommended that "Congress amend [the default] exemption
so that its applicability will depend upon the nature of the overall business con-
ducted by the party to be exempted rather than the status of individual obliga-
tions when the party obtained them." FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2001 FTC ANN. REP.:
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/
03/fdcpaar2000.htm. Had Congress adopted this recommendation, Financial
Outsourcing might have had another avenue to explore.
126. North Shore had previously identified itself as a "debt-collector." Alibrandi, 333
F.3d at 83. First Union did nothing to reinstate the consumer's account, so the
so-called default status did not change.
127. The contract stated: "First Union National Bank does not consider these accounts
delinquent." Id. at 84.
128. Id.
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resolution, thus confirming the impression that Financial Outsourcing
was not to play any role in collection.12 9 Financial Outsourcing could
therefore not be faulted for believing that it was merely servicing a
debt that was not yet in default. Since the lessor had already made
clear, through the original collector North Shore, that the debt was
clearly in default, there was nothing that Financial Outsourcing could
do to change the scenario. 130
A person is excluded from the definition of "debt collector" if the
debt is not in default when it is "obtained" by that person.131 The
statutory reference to "obtained" has led some consumers to contend
that the exemption applies only to debts that are transferred or as-
signed to a defendant, and not to those debts that are merely serviced
or collected by a defendant.132 Like the term "default," the term "ob-
tained" is not defined in the statute. But since the term "assignment"
appears elsewhere in the statute, 13 3 there is no reason to believe that
"obtained" should be read so narrowly that it becomes synonymous
with "assigned." It is reasonable, therefore, to read the term as in-
cluding the right to collect a debt for the creditor.13 4 Although Con-
gress did not have service companies in mind when it enacted the
statute, the debts must not be in default when taken for servicing.135
As a creditor's agent, the debt servicer has just as much incentive as
the creditor to maintain a good reputation in the community. There-
fore, Congress did not think it necessary to bring debt servicers within
the FDCPA, since it was more concerned with responding to the need
of the times to control continued abuses by debt collectors. 1
3 6
129. Id.
130. Default did not occur as soon as payment became due. Id. at 87. It was First
Union that started the ball rolling by hiring North Shore to begin collection, and
North Shore identified itself as a debt collector. Id. at 83. There was then no
turning back. Perhaps Financial Outsourcing wanted to be a true servicer, but it
was dealing with a debt that the creditor had already recognized through North
Shore as being in default. It was the status of the debt that mattered.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2000).
132. See Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 106-07 (6th Cir. 1996);
Kvassy v. Hasty, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1270 (D. Kan. 2002).
133. The word "assignment" appears in the definition of the term "creditor." A person
is not a creditor if he "receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default
solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(4).
134. See Wadlington, 76 F.3d 103; Kvassy, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1240; Jones v. Intuition,
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Tenn. 1998).
135. The Senate Report on the FDCPA explained that the congressional committee did
not intend the definition of "debt collector" to cover "mortgage service companies
and others who service outstanding debts for others, so long as the debts were not
in default when taken for servicing." S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3-4, reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698.
136. See Hamilton v. Trover Solutions, Inc., No. 01-650, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8296
(E.D. La. May 13, 2003); Franceschi v. Mautner-Glick Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Although the FDCPA does not contain a definition of "default," an-
other statute may provide an answer for a particular type of loan. In
that event, that statute's definition controls. In Skerry v. Massachu-
setts Higher Education Assistance Corp.,137 the guarantor, American
Student Assistance Corporation, began sending notices to the con-
sumer after the consumer was delinquent for ninety days under his
federal student loan.138 The debtor sued the guarantor for a violation
of the FDCPA, and the guarantor defended on the basis that the loan
was not in default when it sent out its letter to the debtor.139 This
time the court did not have to wonder about the definition, for the
student loan regulations recognized that no default occurred under a
loan until the debt was overdue for at least 180 days.140 In the in-
terim, the guarantor performed an important pre-claim role of coun-
seling the student borrower about avoiding default, and encouraging
him to resume his payments.14 1 It was evident, therefore, from the
137. 73 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 1999).
138. Id. at 50.
139. Id. at 49.
140. Under the Federal Family Education Loan ("FFEL") Program, a default was de-
fined as:
[tihe failure of a borrower . . . to make an installment payment when
due, or to meet other terms of the promissory note.., if the Secretary or
guaranty agency finds it reasonable to conclude that the borrower... no
longer intend[s] to honor the obligation to repay, provided that this fail-
ure persists for-
(1) 180 days for a loan repayable in monthly installments; or
(2) 240 days for a loan repayable in less frequent installments.
34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (1998) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2004)).
Under the current regulations, the delinquency must continue for 270 days for a
monthly installment loan, and for 330 days for a loan repayable in less frequent
installments. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2004).
141. The regulations defined preclaims assistance as follows:
(ii) Preclaims assistance means collection assistance made available to
the lender by the guaranty agency no later than the 90th day of de-
linquency. This assistance must include collection activities that are
at least as forceful as the level of preclaims assistance performed by
the guaranty agency as of October 16, 1990, and involves the initia-
tion by the guaranty agency of at least 3 collection activities, one of
which is a letter designed to encourage the borrower to begin or re-
sume repayment. As part of their preclaims assistance, guaranty
agencies must provide counseling and consumer information (in
written or other format) to the borrower by the 10th working day
after the agency receives the lender's request for preclaims assis-
tance informing the borrower of all of the borrower's options to avoid
default, including the availability of consolidating delinquent loans
under the FFEL Program or the Federal Direct Consolidation Loan
Program.
34 C.F.R. § 682.404(a)(2)(ii) (1998). It is to be noted that the guaranty agency
was to inform the borrower of options "to avoid default." Thus, even though the
borrower might have been delinquent, he was not yet "in default." The current
regulation continues the same theme with the term "default aversion assistance."
See 34 C.F.R. § 682.404(a)(2)(ii) (2004).
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regulations that there was a difference between a delinquent debt and
a defaulted debt.142
When the guarantor of a student loan steps into the picture, it is
trying to rescue the student borrower before she enters default, and
this accounts for the grace period following the due date of pay-
ment.14 3 If the FDCPA applied in this context, the guarantor would
hardly be able to exert its best efforts in trying to get the student bor-
rower back on track. In this respect, the guarantor must keep the
lines of communication open in order to achieve its objective of restor-
ing the borrower to good standing.144 If the guarantor were a collec-
tor, it would have to include a validation notice with its first
communication (or at least within five days),145 and this would surely
be inconsistent with the objective of assisting the borrower before she
defaults. The FDCPA limits the type and frequency of contacts that a
collector may make with the debtor,146 while the regulations of the
Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP") promote the con-
tinued interaction between the guarantor and the debtor.147 It is no
surprise, therefore, that the debtor's delinquency on a student loan
does not result in an immediate default.
Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the parties to a private
loan from stipulating an earlier default in their contract. In Hartman
v. Meridian Financial Services, Inc.,' 48 the contract provided for a de-
fault if the consumer failed to pay "on time."149 Despite this unambig-
uous language, the collector tried to use the Skerry approach to avoid
the strict "on time" requirement.15 0 The Hartman court readily
pointed out that the loan at issue did not fall under the FFELP, and
that the federal regulation governing it could not affect the time of
default under the timeshare loan.151 This decision underscored the
142. The borrower's failure to pay had to continue for 180 days in the case of a loan
payable in monthly installments. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (1998).
143. See Jones v. Intuition, 12 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Games v.
Cavazos, 737 F. Supp. 1368, 1385 (D. Del. 1990).
144. One court viewed the purpose of the 180-day period this way:
The provision of a regulation requiring a 180-day period to pass prior to
defaulting a student loan debt is a function of the consumer protection
built into the FFELP. It provides time for necessary counseling and cre-
ation of alternate payment plans for the debtor, with the ultimate goal of
default aversion.
Skerry v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 47, 53 (D.
Mass. 1999).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
146. See id. § 1692c(a)-(c).
147. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.404(a)(2)(ii) (2004) (default aversion assistance to the bor-
rower).
148. 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
149. Id. at 1043.
150. See id. at 1043-44.
151. Id. at 1044.
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fact that in the absence of specific statutory or regulatory language
governing the definition of "default," a court must look to the parties'
agreement for a resolution of the problem. 15 2
There was a variation on the theme in Kvassay v. Hasty,153 when a
defendant tried to collect the plaintiffs' alleged obligations because the
checks that the plaintiffs had issued were subsequently lost. The de-
fendants' position was that they were not debt collectors because the
debts were not in default when the defendants obtained them for col-
lection.154 This was another case where the plaintiffs confused a debt
that was in "default" with one that was "overdue" or "delinquent."
Even though the lost checks became overdue after ninety days, they
were not in default.155 Once the checks were issued, there was a sus-
pension of the underlying obligation until the check was either paid or
certified.156 Such a suspension did not result in a default.157 There-
fore, the defendant came within the exemption contained in the defini-
tion of "debt collector." This application of the exemption was
consistent with the Skerry and Hartman decisions, inasmuch as it rec-
ognized once again that a debtor's delinquency or failure to pay on
time does not necessarily constitute a default, and that one must look
to the parties' contract or applicable law to determine whether a de-
fault has in fact occurred.
IV. VALIDATING THE DEBT
A. The Problem of Competing Messages
The FDCPA provides the necessary framework for a debt collector
to inform the consumer about the details of the debt.158 At the same
152. The defendant in Hartman wanted to use the definition of default that the Skerry
court used. Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. The Federal Family Education
Loan Program discussed in Skerry has its own regulations defining default, and
so it had no application to the kind of loan at issue in Hartman. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.200(b) (2004).
153. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Kan. 2002).
154. See id. at 1270.
155. The local statute provides that a check becomes due "90 days after its date." KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 84-3-304(a)(2) (1996). The official comment recognizes that "[a]
check becomes stale after 90 days." Id. § 84-3-304 cmt. 1. A check that is stale is
not necessarily in default.
156. The statute provides in pertinent part: "In the case of an uncertified check, sus-
pension of the obligation continues until dishonor of the check or until it is paid
or certified." Id. § 84-3-310(b)(1).
157. Even if the checks were lost, a person seeking to enforce them could follow the
statutory procedure for enforcement as long as the person was entitled to enforce
them when he lost possession. See id. § 84-3-309. Nevertheless, this provision
for enforcing lost checks does not relate to default at all.
158. The FDCPA provides the following validation mechanism:
(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in
connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, un-
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time, it requires the collector to notify the consumer about the right to
dispute the validity of the debt.159 One can hardly quarrel with the
congressional intent to make the consumer fully aware of the salient
aspects of the transaction,160 but the agony suffered by collectors and
consumers alike in dealing with the validation section raises ques-
tions about the utility of the notice in its present form.
A collector must inform the consumer that if the consumer dis-
putes the debt in writing, the debt collector will verify the debt for the
consumer.161 If the consumer disputes the debt, the debt collector
must suspend its collection efforts until it verifies the debt.162 If the
consumer merely disputes the debt orally, the debt collector does not
have to verify the debt, but there is no assumption that the debt is
valid.163 The difficulty with the validation section is that although a
debt collector must inform the consumer of the consumer's statutory
right to challenge the debt within thirty days, it may nevertheless si-
multaneously pursue the debtor with collection language that may
less the following information is contained in the initial communica-
tion or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written
notice containing-
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after
receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any por-
tion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt
collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of
the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy
of such verification or judgment will be mailed to consumer by
the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer
with the name and address of the original creditor, if different
from the current creditor.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
159. See id. § 1692g(a)(4).
160. The Senate report explained the significance of the validation provision:
Another significant feature of this legislation is its provision requir-
ing the validation of debts. After initially contacting a consumer, a debt
collector must send him or her written notice stating the name of the
creditor and the amount owed. If the consumer disputes the validity of
the debt within 30 days, the debt collector must cease collection until he
sends the consumer verification.
This provision will eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors
dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the con-
sumer has already paid.
S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
162. Id. § 1692g(b).
163. See id. § 1692g(a)(3).
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leave the consumer in a quandary. 16 4 When the consumer receives
the debt collector's assurance that he has thirty days to register any
objections to the debt collector's claim, it is natural for him to think
that he has some leeway in responding. Nevertheless, the consumer's
satisfaction with the dispute period may be short-lived when the con-
sumer reads other language in the collection letter that demands pay-
ment immediately, or at least within a certain period that falls short
of the thirty days for disputing the debt. 165 The statute therefore cre-
ates a challenge for the collector to craft its demands in such a way
that they do not contradict or overshadow the validation notice. 16 6
From the consumer's perspective, it seems that this tension be-
tween the consumer's right to dispute the debt and the collector's right
to pursue the consumer within the same thirty-day period can be
avoided by providing a respite for the consumer from the collector's
claims. 16 7 It should be enough for a debt collector to inform the con-
sumer about the elements of its claim, and then give him a chance to
react if he wants to do so.16 8 The debt collector should not be able to
use the interim period that is intended for the consumer's reflection as
164. See DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001); Bartlett v.
Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir.
1991); Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991);
Beeman v. Lacy, Katzen, Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
165. See Bartlett, 128 F.3d 497 (demand for payment within one week); Graziano, 950
F.2d 107 (threat to sue if payment not received in ten days); Rhoades v. W. Va.
Credit Bureau Reporting Servs., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (im-
mediate payment demanded); Withers v. Eveland, 988 F. Supp. 942 (E.D. Va.
1997) (demand for full payment within five days).
166. The court in Bartlett v. Heibl underscored the problem in evaluating a typical
collection letter by observing that, "[i]n the typical case, the letter both demands
payment within thirty days and explains the consumer's right to demand verifi-
cation within thirty days. These rights are not inconsistent, but by failing to ex-
plain how they fit together the letter confuses." 128 F.3d at 500.
167. The FTC views the thirty-day time frame as a dispute period in which the con-
sumer can insist on the collector's verification of the debt, rather than as a grace
period during which the collector should suspend activities. See FED. TRADE
COMM'N, 2004 FTC ANN. REP.: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 13 [herein-
after 2004 FTC ANN. REP.], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/03/
2004fdcpareport.pdf. The FTC wants Congress to add a specific provision to the
FDCPA that permits continued collection activity as long as the consumer does
not dispute the debt during that thirty-day period. See id. The FTC believes that
this clarification of the statute should include a caveat that "the collection activ-
ity should not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the con-
sumer's right to dispute the debt . . . ." Id. It is this overshadowing and
inconsistency that has plagued courts over the years and the FTC's recommenda-
tion does not alleviate the problem.
168. The point here is that once the collector sends its initial communication with the
basic details and the validation notice, the collector should then have to wait for a
certain period of time before resuming its pursuit of the consumer. The collector
should not be able to make any demands or threats within that initial grace
period.
[Vol. 83:762
TROUBLE SPOTS IN THE FDCPA
an opportunity to continue its badgering. It is evident that the con-
sumer's statutory right to dispute the debt does not realize its full im-
pact when competing with the debt collector's ability to continue
pressuring the consumer. The statute presents a veiled challenge to
the debt collector to compose delicate language that satisfies the stat-
utory requirements, but also simultaneously allows the debt collector
to impress the consumer with sharp demands for satisfaction of the
outstanding debt.169 There is no magical formula for determining
when the collector has crossed the line, but it is no secret that the debt
collector always wants the consumer to pay more attention to its claim
than to the validation notice.1 70 The debt collector will sometimes use
peculiar language that brings home the message to the consumer
without compromising the statutory notice.1 7 1 It is not clear why the
statute should place the collector in this position, for the natural ten-
dency is for the debt collector to state its claim with sufficient enthusi-
asm that the validation notice loses its appeal. There is no reason for
the statute to insist on these competing interests. It seems preferable
for the consumer to have a short period of time to lodge his objections,
without having to worry at the same time about the debt collector's
assault. It would certainly remove an incentive for the debt collector
to compose language that detracts from the validation notice in an-
other part of the collection letter.172
169. See DeSantis, 269 F.3d 159 (The collector's initial letter demanded the con-
sumer's payment or a valid reason for non-payment.); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989) (The collector's letter referred to the lender as "plaintiff"
and demanded "damages and costs."); Gradisher v. Check Enforcement Unit, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (The collection notice advised that con-
sumer's failure to pay would result in issuance of warrant for arrest.); Edwards v.
McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (The collector threatened to
foreclose on debtors' primary residence.).
170. See United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996) (The col-
lector put large-type validation notice on back of collection letter.); Russell v.
Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (The validation notice on back of letter
was overshadowed and contradicted by a warning that collection would be posted
on the consumer's file if the debt was not paid.); Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv.,
Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (The collection language overshadowed the
validation notice, which was placed at bottom of collection letter.).
171. In Renick v. Dun & Bradstreet Receivable Management Services, 290 F.3d 1055,
1057 (9th Cir. 2002), the collector used language such as "send your payment
today" and 'prompt payment is requested" and the court found no overshadowing
problem. The collection language was in the same font as the validation notice
and conveyed a request rather than a demand. See id.; see also Peter v. GC
Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2002) (no violation where collection lan-
guage was "FULL COLLECTION ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THIS
ACCOUNT IS PAID IN FULL .... TO AVOID FURTHER COLLECTION AC-
TIVITY, YOUR STUDENT LOAN MUST BE PAID IN FULL.").
172. In DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., the collector sent a letter that demanded
that the consumer pay or otherwise give a reason for non-payment. The court
found this letter confusing, because it detracted from the consumer's right to dis-
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It does not take very long to recognize the challenges that a debt
collector must face in getting its message across to the consumer. In
Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc.,173 the collector sought "immediate
payment or a valid reason for [the consumer's] failure to make pay-
ment."174 The collector completed its collection efforts by placing the
validation information on the back of the collection notice. 175 The col-
lector must have felt confident that it had done all it was supposed to
do; yet the consumer complained about the conflict between the collec-
tor's demands and the notice about his right to dispute the debt.176
The Second Circuit emphasized that the debt collector's call for im-
mediate payment did not by itself violate the statute. 177 The debt col-
lector's dereliction lay in refusing to reconcile the demand for payment
with the consumer's right to dispute the debt.17s The court believed
that the debt collector could have met its statutory obligations by in-
cluding in its letter transitional language that explained the relation-
ship between these two essential features. 17 9 The difficulty here is
that the FDCPA sets out the specific information that the debt collec-
tor must provide to the consumer, and there is no statutory roadmap
to guide the debt collector in continuing to press its collection claim. 180
The debt collector, therefore, is free to demand payment while explain-
pute the debt, whether or not the consumer had a valid reason for doing so. 269
F.3d at 162. Cf. Rumpler v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 2d 251,
259 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding no problem with language that requested the con-
sumer to "immediately contact [the collector's] office" and also advised the con-
sumer that "it [was] not in [his] best interest to neglect [the] account any
further"). The court in Rumpler was impressed by the fact that the collection
letter made no demand for immediate payment and contained no threats. See id.
It is still arguable that the collector accomplished its obligation by making the
consumer think twice about his "best interest" rather than about the right to
dispute the debt.
173. 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998).
174. Id. at 84.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 85-86.
178. Id. at 86.
179. Id.; see also Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1997) (The collection
letter was confusing, because it failed to explain how the collector's right to de-
mand payment and the consumer's right to seek verification fit together.).
180. The Bartlett court set out a safe harbor letter that suggested a way to comply
with the statute "without forcing the debt collector to conceal his intention of
exploiting his right to resort to legal action before the thirty days are up." 128
F.3d at 501. Even though that letter is a model of clarity, one may still quibble
with the language relating to the consumer's right to dispute the debt. The letter
does notify the consumer of the right to dispute the validity of the debt or any
part of it. But then it goes on to provide as follows: "If you do dispute it... I will
... mail to you proof of the debt." Id. at 502 (emphasis added). The "it" here
apparently refers to the debt, but the statute requires the collector to give proof of
the debt if the consumer disputes the debt, "or any portion thereof." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g(a)(4) (2000): So, even the Seventh Circuit may have run afoul of the stat-
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ing the nuts and bolts of the consumer's rights. It is conceivable that
Congress may not have recognized the inevitable tension that would
flow from these two competing interests. If a debt collector follows the
statutory prescription, it still may find itself in deep trouble if it
makes its demands without finesse.18 ' The debt collector has to make
sure that it does not lead the consumer astray with competing collec-
tion phraseology.
The contest can be easily avoided by allowing the validation notice
to enjoy the limelight during some short period, even if accompanied
by an abstract statement of the debt's details.' 8 2 The debt collector
seems destined to fail under the present statutory requirements,18 3 as
it will always want to make sure that the consumer is under some
pressure to act on its demands. In Savino, the debt collector commu-
nicated the urgency of the claim by insisting on "immediate pay-
ment."1 8 4 The consumer had to decipher this demand in light of the
important validation notice on the back of the collection letter. A debt
collector cannot be faulted for continuing its collection efforts, because
the statute reins in the collector only if the consumer disputes the debt
in writing.' 8 5 Even then, the collector need only halt its activities un-
til it verifies the information about the debt.186 Although the statute
imposes this obligation on the collector, the collector does not have to
ute with its safe harbor letter. See FAIR DEBT COLLECTION, supra note 89,
§ 5.7.2.6.1, at 223.
181. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1996) (collector violated statute by
stating that if the consumer did not dispute the debt, he must pay in ten days or
risk a lawsuit); Baker v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039 (S.D.
Cal. 1998) (The collection letter violated statute by threatening "trouble of litiga-
tion" and "legal and/or attorneys fees" unless debt was paid "now.").
182. The objective is to convert the so-called dispute period (during which the collector
can continue its collection efforts) into a grace period for the consumer that puts a
temporary stop to such activities. Collectors would then not have to worry about
a consumer's right to seek verification of the debt. Although the FTC recognizes
that there is some sentiment for a grace period, it has urged Congress to clarify
the statutory language by expressly permitting collectors to continue their activi-
ties during the thirty-day dispute period. See 2004 FTC ANN. REP., supra note
167, at 13.
183. The FTC has suggested that the congressional clarification of the validation pro-
vision "should include a caveat that the collection activity should not overshadow
or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt."
Id. The courts have consistently held against overshadowing and contradiction,
but the collectors still have trouble toeing the line. See DeSantis v. Computer
Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2001); Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500-01; Rus-
sell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996); Miller v. Payco-General Am.
Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991).
184. 164 F.3d at 84.
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
186. Id. § 1692g(b). One collector got into trouble, however, by offering to settle the
debt after the consumer had disputed it. The court held this offer to be an at-
tempt to collect the debt, which thus violated the statute. Spencer v. Hender-
son-Webb, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (D. Md. 1999).
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tell the consumer about it.187 If it is so important for the consumer to
have this validation option, it would seem to be equally important for
the consumer to know what impact his exercise of the option will have
on the collector's activities.1 8
Although the statute does not address the importance of the clarity
of the debt collector's disclosures, the courts have made no bones
about insisting that other collection language must not distort or over-
shadow the validation notice. The debt collector's dilemma is in urg-
ing the consumer to repay the debt within a few days, while
reassuring him that he still has thirty days to query the debt. In Rus-
sell v. Equifax A.R.S.,189 the debt collector used its guile to let the
consumer know that she could avoid damage to her credit by paying
within ten days.19o Had the debt collector not given a time limit for
payment, the consumer might not have appreciated the seriousness of
the situation. There was a problem, however, in reconciling the
thirty-day dispute period with the ten-day window for payment. 19 1
The courts have not been willing to overlook this difference in the win-
dows of opportunity, because it leaves the consumer in a quandary
about his choices. They have been keen to prevent collectors from in-
cluding overshadowing or contradicting language in the collection
letters.192
The juxtaposition of two different time periods in the same letter,
one dealing with the dispute period and the other with the collector's
threat to sue, does not necessarily fit neatly within the overshadowing
or contradiction scheme. It is simply that the apparent, though not
actual, inconsistency leads to the consumer's confusion. In Bartlett v.
Heibl,'93 the debt collector gave a clear message that the consumer
could contest the debt within thirty days, but in a previous paragraph
of the same letter the debt collector gave the consumer one week to
settle his debt or face a lawsuit.194 The Seventh Circuit viewed this
juxtaposition of the two different periods as "legal gibberish" and as
bad as an "outright contradiction."195 Despite this observation, the
court conceded that it was nevertheless possible for a collector to con-
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
188. It is to be noted that the court's safe haven validation notice in Bartlett v. Heibl
does tell the consumer that the collector must suspend its collection efforts if the
consumer requests verification of the debt. See Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 502.
189. 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
190. Id. at 32.
191. Id. at 34.
192. See Chauncey v. JDR Recovery Corp., 118 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1997); Graziano v.
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991); Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc.,
943 F.2d 482, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Service, Inc., 869
F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988).
193. 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997).
194. Id. at 501.
195. Id.
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vey a message to the consumer about the risk of a lawsuit without
detracting from the consumer's rights. 19 6 The court must not have
regarded this as some kind of routine accomplishment, because it then
proceeded to draft a letter that would provide a safe harbor for debt
collectors within the Seventh Circuit. 197 The court's contribution
bears testimony to the fact that any debt collector faces a difficult
challenge in explaining how the two elements fit together. The plain-
tiff in Bartlett tried to convince the court that the collector could not
threaten to bring a lawsuit within the thirty-day dispute period.1 98
There was nothing to support that theory, because the statute does
not prohibit the collector from continuing its collection efforts, unless
the consumer stops the collector in its tracks with a written verifica-
tion request. 19 9
Even though the safe harbor letter in Bartlett offers some comfort
to collectors in the Seventh Circuit, it still does not solve the problem
for consumers. It is, quite frankly, not the court's fault. The statute
allows the collector to throw down the gauntlet and then retreat gen-
tly with the validation language. The point is that, in a Bartlett-type
case, the consumer does not really have thirty days to dispute the va-
lidity of the debt. It is only thirty days if the collector decides that it
does not want to act between the "one week" and the "thirty days."
2 00
In the meantime, the consumer is not sure what to do. She is unsure
about the meaning of the time periods. The court's safe harbor letter
helps in one respect to clear the air by clarifying that the consumer
can put a temporary stop to the collector's efforts by disputing the debt
in writing. 20 1 It is noteworthy, however, that the statute does not re-
quire a collector to tell a consumer about this suspension of activities
196. Id.
197. Id. at 501-02.
198. See id. at 501.
199. The court confirmed that "[t]he debt collector is perfectly free to sue within thirty
days." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2000)). The challenge is in devising "a
form of words that will inform the debtor of the risk of his being sued without
detracting from the statement of his statutory rights." Id.
200. The courts and the FTC have consistently taken the position that the thirty-day
time frame is not a grace period during which a collector must stop its collection
activities. They view it as the time in which the consumer may dispute the debt,
but the collector is free to continue its collection efforts as long as the consumer
has not sought verification of the debt. See Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167
F.3d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1999); Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 501; FTC Staff Commen-
tary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,109 (Dec. 13, 1999).
201. The court's model letter advised as follows:
If, however, you request proof of the debt or the name and address of the
original creditor within the thirty-day period that begins with your re-
ceipt of this letter, the law requires me to suspend my efforts (through
litigation or otherwise) to collect the debt until I mail the requested in-
formation to you.
Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 502.
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during the verification process.20 2 It is the missing link that contrib-
utes to a consumer's confusion. The Bartlett court was mindful to in-
clude this bit of information to make the picture complete. If the
statute continues to offer no restriction on the debt collector's lan-
guage about a lawsuit, at least it should require the collector to inform
the consumer about this strategy for keeping the collector at bay while
the collector garners proof about the debt.203
It is no secret that the threat of a lawsuit within a certain number
of days when combined with the statutory notice of a thirty-day dis-
pute period poses problems for the debt collector in terms of complying
with the FDCPA. The courts are more tolerant, however, if the collec-
tor does not specify a time period for payment, even if it uses language
that craves the consumer's urgent attention. Therefore, a debt collec-
tor will find judicial sympathy if it requests payment without "further
delay."20 4 That kind of language would not confuse the consumer into
thinking that he no longer has thirty days to lodge his objections.
There is no actual or apparent contradiction here, because the debt
collector still has the right to continue its collection activities, as long
as it does not encroach on the consumer's statutory right to seek ver-
ification. The debt collector's language does not demand payment
within a period shorter than thirty days, thus avoiding the conflict
that torments courts in this context.
Allowing the debt collector to send two messages to the consumer
in the same letter obviously opens the door to imaginative drafting. In
Wilson v. Quadramed Corp.,205 the collector was polite; it allowed the
consumer the opportunity to pay the bill immediately and avoid fur-
ther action.206 This time the court sided with the collector, even
though the debt collector urged the consumer to act "immediately."207
The court was persuaded by the lack of a demand or threat by the
202. The court must have realized the significance of this information. The suspen-
sion of collection activities provides some respite for the consumer. Congress
could have incorporated the language of subsection (b) as a part of the disclosure
requirements of § 1692g(a), thus adding a paragraph (6) that would require the
collector to provide a statement to the consumer about the collector's obligation to
suspend collection activities if the consumer disputes the debt.
203. The consumer may want to know that she has the right to put a temporary stop
to the collector's activities, even if she is somewhat familiar with the basis of the
collector's claim. See Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo.
1989). In some cases the collector may choose to cease trying to collect, and thus
not provide verification of the debt. See Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d
480 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992).
204. See Vasquez v. Gertler & Gertler, Ltd., 987 F. Supp. 652, 658 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see
also Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no violation
when collection letter asks consumer to telephone collection assistant
immediately).
205. 225 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000).
206. Id. at 352.
207. Id.
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collector. 2 08 Thus, the court saw the collection letter as a request
rather than a demand for payment, and the debt collector merely gave
the consumer an option of paying immediately or disputing the debt
within thirty days.2 09 No doubt the delicate collection language had
some impact on the court's view of things, for the court read the letter
as offering a reasonable choice for the consumer to act without undue
prodding by the collector. 2 10
In Savino, the debt collector had difficulty because it insisted that
the consumer pay immediately or give a valid reason for not doing
s0.2 11 There was no transitional language linking that demand to the
consumer's validation rights.2 12 On the other hand, the Wilson collec-
tor seemed interested in giving the consumer the opportunity to make
his choice about paying or disputing the debt.213 It chose the right
language to achieve its objective without sacrificing the legitimacy of
the validation notice. The debt collector similarly satisfied the Fifth
Circuit in Peter v. GC Services L.P.214 that there was no violation
when the collector advised the consumer that full collection activity
would continue until the account was paid in full.2 15 There was no
time limit in the collector's warning, and the language about payment
did not in any way detract from the consumer's right to dispute the
208. See id. at 356. There was no demand or threat like that in Graziano v. Harrison,
950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991), where the collector threatened immediate legal
action if his demand for payment within ten days was not met. The Wilson court
viewed the consumer as having the option of paying immediately to avoid further
action or notifying the collector within thirty days that he disputed the debt. See
225 F.3d at 356.
209. The court was impressed with the fact that "the letter [did] not emphasize one
option over the other." Id.
210. The courts seem to be impressed with the gentler approach. For example, the
collection letter in Burns v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections of Virginia, Inc.,
828 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1993), advised the consumer as follows: "THE
ABOVE ACCOUNT HAS BEEN LISTED WITH THIS AGENCY FOR IMMEDI-
ATE COLLECTION. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. THEREFORE IT IS IM-
PORTANT THAT PAYMENT IN FULL FOR $3547.46 BE MADE TODAY." Id.
at 476. The court did not see any conflict with the validation notice, and treated
the collector's language as indicating an interest in collecting the debt in a timely
manner. See Burns, 828 F. Supp. at 477.
211. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998).
212. See id. at 86. It is this failure to explain the connection that has worried courts.
See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1997); Russell v. Equifax
A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996); Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc.,
943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991).
213. The collector's request for payment did not have a time limit. See Wilson, 225
F.3d at 356 (quoting Burns, 828 F. Supp. at 477). The collector studiously
avoided specific limiting language by using terms such as "time is of the essence"
and "today," thus convincing the court to treat the request as one for payment "in
a timely fashion." Id. at 356-57.
214. 310 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2002).
215. Id. at 350.
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debt.216 It is arguable that the collector did not really demand pay-
ment, but rather confirmed that it would continue its collection activ-
ity until the consumer paid. Even so, it is noteworthy that the
collector could not have continued "full collection activity" if the con-
sumer had disputed the debt, for the collector would have had to sus-
pend its efforts until it could provide the necessary verification.217
Although the statute does not require the collector to notify the con-
sumer about this possibility, it would seem that the collector in Peter
should have undertaken the responsibility to relate the activity clause
to the validation notice.218 A consumer may have more incentive to
seek information from the collector if he realizes that there will be a
temporary halt in the collector's communication when he does so.
When the debt collector does not include a time limit in its demand
for payment, a court has more flexibility in determining whether the
collector has violated the statute. In Kramsky v. Trans-Continental
Credit & Collection Corp.,219 the debt collector seemed almost apolo-
getic in its letter to the consumer. The first paragraph informed the
consumer that the account had been referred for collection and that
the consumer should use the enclosed envelope to pay the debt in
full. 220 There was no demand for payment within a certain time, and
there was no threat of consequences if the consumer did not act. The
precatory language in Kramsky contrasted sharply with the language
of insistence in Russell, and of immediacy in Savino.221 The Kramsky
court could find no fault with the collection letter, which adequately
216. Id.
217. The statute does not require the collector to notify the consumer about its obliga-
tion to suspend collection activities if the consumer questions the debt. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692g (2000). Thus, the collector in Peter was technically in compliance
when he promised full collection activity until the consumer paid up. See Peter,
310 F.3d at 347. Nevertheless, there is still a sound basis for requiring the collec-
tor to disclose what will result from the consumer's request for verification of the
debt.
218. The collector obviously wanted to convince the consumer that it would not stop its
collection activities until the debt was paid. See 310 F.3d at 349. The collector
was not really free to do whatever it wanted if the consumer disputed the debt.
See id. at 348-49; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). This missing link between collec-
tion and a consumer's verification request is what causes problems. It seems that
the collector should have an obligation to explain the matter by providing some
transitional language. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 85-86
(2d Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Roger
S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 56 SMU L. REV. 1145, 1169 n.139
(2003).
219. 166 F. Supp. 2d 908 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
220. Id. at 909.
221. Compare Kramsky, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 909 ("we must ask that you remit the bal-
ance shown in full"), with Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996)
("PAYMENT IN FULL WITHIN 5 DAYS IS NOW DEMANDED"), and Savino,
164 F.3d at 84 ("The hospital insists on immediate payment or a valid reason for
your failure to make payment.").
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informed the consumer about the debt, included the validation notice,
and even advised the consumer what to do if he had insurance.
2 22
Such language of restraint certainly has its own rewards. It can
sometimes convince a debtor about the seriousness of a debt collector's
position without detracting from the validation message. That is what
a debt collector strives for when it communicates with a consumer
about the debt. It is not unusual, however, for a consumer to be unim-
pressed with a collector's delicate language. Therefore, the debt col-
lector has to toe a fine line in attracting the consumer's attention to
the outstanding debt, while simultaneously driving home the con-
sumer's right to dispute it. The present statutory framework may en-
courage a collector to dilute its collection language in order to avoid
any conflict with the validation notice. The debt collector must face
the inevitable challenge of reconciling the two positions. One may find
a debt collector encouraging a consumer to "[a]ct now to satisfy [the]
debt"2 23 without any threat of sanctions for failure to comply within a
stipulated period. On reflection, it seems that this kind of language is
not likely to prod the consumer into immediate action, but on the
other hand, it seems to provide a safe harbor for the collector.
224
There is nothing wrong in principle with this approach, because the
language does not send a conflicting message that weakens the con-
sumer's right to challenge the debt. Nevertheless, it is troubling that
the statute puts pressure on a debt collector to create the right mix of
language if the debt collector wants to avoid the charge of contra-
dicting or overshadowing the validation formula.
2 25
Even when a debt collector urges a consumer to pay "today" or to
make "prompt payment," it still has to worry about its statutory re-
sponsibilities. 2 26 The debt collector must always be concerned about
222. See 166 F. Supp. 2d at 908-09.
223. Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, LLC, 365 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2004).
224. The Taylor court reacted favorably to the collector's language with this
explanation:
"Act now to satisfy your debt" is in the nature of puffing, in the sense
of rhetoric designed to create a mood rather than to convey concrete in-
formation or misinformation ("Buy Now!" "Best Deal Ever!" "We Will Not
Be Undersold!"), as it is perfectly obvious to even the dimmest debtor
that the debt collector would very much like him to pay the amount de-
manded straight off, sparing the debt collector any further expense.
Id.
225. It is even more challenging for a collector to produce the right formula if any
contradiction need not be threatening for a violation to occur. See Beeman v.
Lacy, Katzen, Ryen & Mittleman, 892 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
226. Compare Renick v. Dun & Bradstreet, 290 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
request for prompt payment was not a violation, because it was in the same font
as the validation notice and did not convey a threat), with Johnson v. Revenue
Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that a collection letter de-
manding prompt payment and immediate action stated a cause of action suffi-
cient to withstand motion to dismiss).
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the consumer's propensity to act in the face of a gentle reminder about
the debt. If the debt collector's language lacks the necessary punch,
the consumer likely will not take it seriously, and the debt collector
will find itself repeating the same message time after time without
any appreciable effect on the consumer. In light of this, it may be bet-
ter to give equal billing to the collector's demands and the consumer's
right.227 If the debt collector merely gives a brief statement about its
claim, but also gives the validation language full billing in its first
communication, that will go a long way toward avoiding the potential
problems caused by confusing language. With the validation notice
out of the way, the collector can then devote its full energies to its
recovery efforts in subsequent notices to the consumer. 2 28
It is not easy for a debt collector to strike the proper balance be-
tween the two competing interests. A debt collector tried to press
home its advantage in DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc.,229 by de-
manding payment from the consumer or a valid reason from the con-
sumer for not paying.2 30 It was not surprising that the court found
that the collection letter had sufficient capacity to confuse a con-
sumer. 23 1 The consumer might have felt compelled to give some rea-
227. The court in Johnson v. Revenue Management Corp. posed the relevant question:
"Did the letter confuse its recipients-and confuse them about the statutory enti-
tlements, not just about what words such as 'prompt' mean in the abstract. If the
letter effectively advises the consumer about the statutory entitlements, then the
Act has been satisfied." 169 F.3d at 1060.
228. The objective is to allow a consumer adequate time to digest the relevant infor-
mation and give him the procedure for disputing the debt. After an appropriate
grace period, the collector may resume its collection activities. The present statu-
tory language requires a collector to cease such activities only if the consumer
disputes the debt in writing. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2000).
229. 269 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
230. Id. at 160.
231. Id. at 162. Although the court referred to the "unsophisticated consumer," it in
fact applied the "least sophisticated consumer" standard in determining whether
the consumer stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 161.
Most courts apply the "least sophisticated consumer" standard, which is a more
demanding one than merely examining the effect of the validation notice on a
reasonable consumer, but which still protects the debt collector from bizarre in-
terpretations of the FDCPA. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81,
85-86 (2d Cir. 1998); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1029 (6th
Cir. 1992); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991); Swanson v. S.
Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988).
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has preferred the "unsophisticated
consumer" standard. It stated its position in Gammon v. GC Services Ltd. Part-
nership, 27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994), as follows: "We reiterate that an unsophis-
ticated consumer standard protects the consumer who is uninformed, naive, or
trusting, yet it admits an objective element of reasonableness. The reasonable-
ness element in turn shields complying debt collectors from liability for unrealis-
tic or peculiar interpretations of collection letters." Id. at 1257. The court was
unhappy with the "least sophisticated consumer" approach, because such a con-
sumer is "the very last rung on the sophistication ladder" and would most likely
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son for not paying, even though the statute gave him an absolute right
to query the debt.232 The debt collector could hardly be faulted for
trying to elicit a meaningful response from the consumer, but the at-
tempt to do so left the consumer in doubt about his options.233 No
doubt the debt collector wanted to leave the impression that the con-
sumer needed a reason for not paying, and that the consumer had to
convey that to the collector in good time. It was a device that was sure
to mislead the consumer into thinking that any challenge to the debt
required an explanation.
A debt collector's letter urging the consumer to call the collector or
to make a partial payment will not usually cause any difficulty for the
collector. Courts are sympathetic to this kind of language, because it
is an inducement to pay that does not detract from the consumer's
right to seek information about the debt.234 In this sense, it is very
much like the situation where the collector merely informs the con-
sumer about the debt, advises him of the right of validation, and then
waits for a subsequent opportunity to be more aggressive about the
outstanding debt. An escalation of the collector's demands usually
will bring the collector closer to a conflict with the validation lan-
be unable "to read a collection notice with care (or at all), let alone interpret it in
a reasonable fashion." Id. In Peter v. GC Services L.P., 310 F.3d 344 (5th Cir.
2002), the Fifth Circuit avoided choosing either of the two standards, because
"the difference between [them] is de minimis at most." Id. at 349 n.1. When the
Seventh Circuit had another go at the standard in Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222
(7th Cir. 1996), it stuck with the "unsophisticated consumer" approach, but con-
ceded that such a standard was "a distinction without much of a practical differ-
ence in application." Id. at 227.
232. The consumer may query the debt for any number of reasons. He may not recog-
nize the creditor's name, or he may be unsure about the amount of the debt. See
Avila, 84 F.3d at 227. The collector's language in DeSantis put the consumer
under pressure not dictated by the statute. The consumer did not have to give a
reason for asking questions about the debt, whether such reason was valid or not.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
233. This is just another of the problems caused by allowing the collector to include its
collection language with the validation notice. The collector in DeSantis tried its
best to force the consumer into some kind of response by insisting on "payment or
a valid reason for ... failure to make payment." 269 F.3d at 160. If the consumer
wanted to delay payment, he had to determine for himself if the reason for his
doing so was valid.
234. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 310 (2d Cir. 2003) (find-
ing no violation where front of letter requested consumer to call or write the col-
lector even though validation notice was on back), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 823
(2003); Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that re-
quest that consumer call collector immediately did not violate statute); Lerner v.
Forster, 240 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding no violation where
letter required consumer to make full payment or call collector's client to arrange
partial payment); Wallace v. Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (D. Md.
2001) (finding that collector did not violate statute by inviting consumer to call if
he had any questions about the debt).
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guage. The collector's invitation to call is not by itself damaging, but
its combination with other collection language can cause problems.
In Rhoades v. West Virginia Credit Bureau Reporting Services,
Inc.,235 the collection notice not only asked the consumer to call "to-
day," but also demanded "immediate payment" of the full amount. 23 6
The additional language must have cast a different light on the scene,
especially when the collector's demands appeared in larger type than
the validation notice.2 37 It was this latter element that led the court
to find an overshadowing of the notice. The result may be different if
the debt collector not only requests the consumer to call, but also re-
fers the consumer to the validation notice on the back of the collection
letter. This provides ample evidence that, rather than trying to over-
shadow the validation notice, the collector is ensuring that it attracts
the consumer's attention to the vital validation information. 2 38
B. The Requirement of a Writing
Although the validation section is intended for the consumer's ben-
efit, courts disagree about whether a consumer must dispute the debt
in writing if he wants to dispute it at all. This disagreement exists
because § 1692g(a)(3) does not call for a writing when the consumer
merely disputes the validity of the debt.239 On the other hand, if
the consumer wants the collector to verify the debt, § 1692g(a)(4) re-
quires the consumer to notify the collector in writing of the dispute. 240
Furthermore, there is a similar requirement for a writing under
§ 1692g(a)(5) if the consumer wants to find out the name and address
of the original creditor, which may be different from the current credi-
tor.24 1 Some courts have imported the requirement of a writing
235. 96 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. W. Va. 2000).
236. Id. at 530.
237. See id. If a collector persuades the consumer to call about the debt, the statute
does not require the collector to verify the debt because any such verification re-
quest must be in writing. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). By acceding to the collector's
request, the consumer may let the thirty-day validation period expire without
realizing what he has done. See Rhoades, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 532; see also Miller v.
Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991).
238. See Miller, 321 F.3d at 310 (finding no violation where the collection letter re-
peatedly referred to the validation notice on back and advised the consumer to
call only if the consumer did not wish to exercise statutory rights outlined in the
validation notice); Youngblood v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 186 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699
(W.D. Tex. 2002) (motion for summary judgment denied where genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether prominent display of validation notice on the
back of the letter was adequate to warn the debtor about validation rights).
239. The statute provides that the collector must give the consumer written notice
containing "a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after re-
ceipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
240. Id. § 1692g(a)(4).
241. Id. § 1692g(a)(5).
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into § 1692g(a)(3), so that it is consistent with § 1692g(a)(4) and
§ 1692g(a)(5). 2 42 In doing so, they have not given a convincing expla-
nation about a reason for the congressional exclusion of a "writing"
requirement in § 1692g(a)(3).
In § 1692g(a)(3), a consumer can orally dispute the validity of the
debt if he does not want the debt collector to assume that the debt is
valid. 243 Under § 1692g(a)(4), the consumer must notify the debt col-
lector "in writing" that he disputes the debt if the consumer wants a
verification of the debt.244 Why did Congress make a point of omitting
the "in writing" language in § 1692g(a)(3) if it did not intend the sec-
tion to have a different meaning from § 1692g(a)(4)?
In construing this section, one must look at its express language.
If it is not ambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to its legislative his-
tory, and the plain language of the statute should carry the day.245 If
the statute's literal application will produce a result that is clearly at
odds with the drafters' intent, then it is permissible to apply an excep-
tion to the plain language approach.2 46 There does not seem to be a
place for any exception here. Congress knew full well what it was do-
ing when it drafted § 1692g. This is not a case where the words "in
writing" were omitted by mistake and the other parts of the two sec-
tions remained the same. When Congress includes certain language
in one part of a section but omits it in others, the presumption is that
Congress intended to make a distinction.2 4 7 Although Congress omit-
ted the words "in writing" from § 1692g(a)(3), it included them in
§ 1692g(a)(4) for the consumer to get verification of the debt and in
§ 1692g(a)(5) for the consumer to obtain the name and address of the
original creditor. Furthermore, the language also appears in
§ 1692g(b), which requires the collector to cease collection of the debt
until it obtains verification. 248 It is hardly likely that Congress in-
242. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991); Ingram v. Corporate
Receivables, Inc., No. 02 C 6608, 2003 WL 21018650, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2003);
Jolly v. Shapiro, 237 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894-95 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Wallace v. Capital
One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (D. Md. 2001); Sturdevant v. Jolas, 942 F.
Supp. 426, 429 (W.D. Wis. 1996). But see Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC,
Inc., No. IP 00-1340-C-T/K, 2002 WL 31854892, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 2002);
Ong v. Am. Collections Enter., No. 98-CV-5117, 1999 WL 51816, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 15, 1999).
243. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
244. Id. § 1692g(a)(4).
245. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); 2A SINGER, supra
note 32, § 46.04.
246. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
247. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983); United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972); 2A SINGER, supra note 32, § 46.06.
248. It is noteworthy that § 1692g(b) uses the language "notifies the debt collector in
writing... that the debt.., is disputed," whereas the § 1692g(a)(3) language is
"disputes the validity of the debt," and the § 1692g(a)(5) language is "written re-
quest." The phrases (except that in subsection (a)(3)) relate to action that the
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tended that the "in writing" requirement should be implied, given the
care with which it constructed § 1692g.
If one assumes that § 1692g(a)(3) requires no writing, one must
still question why Congress intended the statute to operate in this
way. The Third Circuit in Graziano v. Harrison2 49 thought that Con-
gress could never have intended "so incoherent a system."250 The
court was bothered by the fact that even when the consumer disputes
the debt orally, so as to call its validity into question, the debt collector
still does not have any obligation to verify the debt.251 It seemed to
question the utility of a consumer's right to lodge an oral objection if
the consumer cannot force the collector to respond. 252 If the debt col-
lector knows that the consumer disputes the debt, it may be motivated
to investigate the matter even in the absence of a writing.2 53 After all,
if a consumer creates some doubt about the validity of the debt, the
collector may save time and expense in not pursuing the consumer
when there is no valid claim. The theory here is that the consumer
may still use any device to let the debt collector know about his mis-
givings about the debt, and that there is no rationale for depriving
him of that right.2 54 This informal approach does not detract from the
formal requirements of § 1692g(a)(4), under which the collector must
verify the debt or obtain a copy of any existing judgment. 255 The
§ 1692g(a)(3) approach commends itself particularly in those cases
where the consumer is unable to comply immediately with the re-
quirement of a writing, but nevertheless wants the debt collector to
know that there is something wrong with the debt collector's claim.2 56
Congress must have felt that it was well worth the effort to give the
oral objectors some mechanism for querying the debt, without neces-
consumer must take in order to control the collector's conduct. In the case of
§ 1692g(a)(3), there is a presumption of the debt's validity unless the consumer
acts. The point here is that the drafters used different language in some of the
sections. This does not seem to be a fortuitous event.
249. 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
250. Id. at 112.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Sanchez v. Weiss, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Ong v. Am.
Collections Enter., Inc., No. 98-CV-5117, 1999 WL 51816, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
1999).
254. One court has recognized that § 1692g(a)(3) "provides a means for the debt collec-
tor to receive information quickly, which may save time and expense in pursuing
an otherwise invalid debt." Sanchez, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000).
256. The Sanchez court acknowledged that "a consumer that is unable to communicate
in writing, or simply wishes to quickly and informally clear up the matter, is
afforded limited protection under § 1692g(a)(3)." 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. If the
consumer wishes to benefit from the greater protection afforded by
§ 1692g(a)(4)-(5), then he must follow the requirement of a writing to force the
collector to act.
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sarily mandating the other statutory protections of § 1692g(a)(4).257
One can hardly fault Congress for this feature, since it provides an
option for the consumer to draw the debt collector's attention to his
concerns about the debt.258
Nevertheless, despite this admirable attempt to assist the con-
sumer, Congress may have posed a challenge to the collector to craft
its message in such a way that the consumer will understand the
available options. The consumer must understand that she can ques-
tion the debt in more than one way, but that she must do so in writing
if she wants the debt collector to verify the debt or to provide the name
and address of the original creditor. 25 9 Once again, the debt collector
is in the position of having to stick slavishly to the statutory language
if it expects to avoid problems relating to the validation notice. But
even so, one wonders whether the statute is as clear as it ought to be
for the collector to convey an effective message to the least sophisti-
cated consumer.2 60 Take, for example, the case where the collector
uses the following language:
Federal law gives you thirty (30) days after you receive this letter to dis-
pute the validity of the debt or any part of it. If you don't dispute it within
that period, we will assume that it is valid. If you do dispute it-by notifying
us in writing to that effect-we will, as required by law, obtain and mail to
you proof of the debt. 2
6 1
Quite frankly, by putting the phrase "by notifying us in writing to
that effect" after the word "dispute," the collector creates the impres-
257. If the consumer disputes the debt, the collector may not assume that the debt is
valid. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). Even if there is no statutory obligation to
obtain verification of the debt when there is no written dispute, the collector will
have some motivation for doing so. As a matter of principle, it will want to reas-
sure itself sooner rather than later about the validity of the debt. See Sanchez,
173 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. There is nothing incoherent about the option that the
statute provides to the consumer. The Graziano court took the view that such a
choice produced an incoherency that could not be tolerated. 950 F.2d at 112; see
also Wallace v. Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (D. Md. 2001).
258. The option would be meaningful in this context only if there is no written require-
ment in § 1692g(a)(3). It must be presumed that Congress excluded such a re-
quirement for a specific purpose. See 2A SINGER, supra note 32, § 46:06, at 192.
It is noteworthy that § 1692g(a)(3) is constructed differently from § 1692g(a)(4).
In the former section, the debt is assumed to be valid unless the consumer "dis-
putes the validity of the debt," whereas in the latter, the collector must act if the
consumer notifies the collector "in writing" that the debt is disputed. Congress
could have used the same phraseology in subsection (a)(3) as it did in subsection
(a)(4) by requiring the consumer to notify the collector in writing that the debt is
disputed if the presumption of validity was to be avoided. Congress may not have
felt bound to construct the sections in a similar fashion, because it did not have
the same objective in mind, that is, to insist on the written word in both sections.
259. See In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 493, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
260. For a discussion of the "least sophisticated consumer" standard, see supra note
231.
261. In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, 208 F.R.D. at 498.
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sion that it is explaining how the consumer may lodge his dispute.
However, there is no language that explains that there is any differ-
ence in meaning between the first use of "dispute" relating to the as-
sumption of validity of the debt, and the second use relating to the
verification of the debt.262 The debt collector in In re Risk Manage-
ment Alternatives2 63 must have thought that it was following the stat-
utory mandate in phrasing its notice to the consumer. The court was
not so sure, but left it to a trial to determine whether the least sophis-
ticated consumer might believe that his challenge to the debt had to
be in writing.2 64
A debt collector can work similar mischief by reversing the order of
§ 1692g(a)(3) and § 1692g(a)(4) in its disclosure notice.2 65 The statute
does not require the notice to be in any particular order, but it is en-
tirely possible that a reference to a writing that relates to verification
may confuse a consumer who reads the language that follows concern-
ing the assumption about validity of the debt.266 There is little com-
fort in assuring the consumer after the fact that the words "in writing"
are missing from § 1692g(a)(3). If Congress wants the consumer to
know that he has a true option of making his objections known either
orally or in writing under § 1692g(a)(3), then it should clarify its posi-
tion by amending the statute accordingly.
C. The Reference to Documentation
Even when the debt collector includes the prescribed validation no-
tice in its letter, its use of additional language may cause enough con-
fusion for the consumer about his statutory rights. In Sambor v.
262. It is reasonable to read the word "dispute" in this context as meaning that a writ-
ing is required in both cases. The interposition of the punctuating dash in the
reference to the "dispute" that would mandate verification seems to confirm the
same meaning for the previous uses of the word "dispute" in the collector's notice.
263. 208 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
264. In doing so, the court denied both the plaintiffs and defendant's motions for sum-
mary judgment. See id. at 503.
265. By putting the § 1692g(a)(4) statement requiring a writing first, a collector might
lead a consumer into believing that the § 1692g(a)(3) statement immediately fol-
lowing always requires a writing.
266. See Goldberg v. Winston & Morrone, P.C., No. 95 Civ. 9282, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3521 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1997). The collection letter read as follows:
If you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion of it, in writing
to our office at the above address within thirty (30) days after receipt of
this letter, we will mail verification of the debt to you. If you do not
dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion of it within thirty days,
we will assume it is valid.
Id. at *2-3. The court refused to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment stating that "[wihether confusion would result from this rearrangement [of
the subsections] is an issue of fact properly reserved for the finder of fact at trial."
Id. at *18.
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Omnia Credit Services, Inc., 2 6 7 the collector must have thought that it
was being helpful by giving the consumer notice not only of his valida-
tion rights, but also of the documentation that would suffice to con-
vince the collector of the invalidity of the debt.268 Had the collector
limited itself to the validation notice, there would have been no prob-
lem. The insertion of the documentation requirement merely clouded
the issue, because the collector left the impression that the consumer
had to provide written evidence to support any dispute claim. Fur-
thermore, the debt collector seemed to make the point that only cer-
tain documentation was suitable, thus leaving no room for unsuitable
documentation. 26 9 It was a misguided effort to put the consumer in a
position to support his claim. The validation section actually puts the
burden on the debt collector to verify the debt once the consumer dis-
putes the debt in writing,2 70 so that the debt collector is the one who
should eventually be concerned about documentation. The listing of
suitable documentation in Sambor upset the validation scheme, since
the statute does not even require the consumer to bother about docu-
mentation in order to dispute the debt.
While the Sambor court was on safe ground in finding that the
debt collector violated § 1692g(a)(3) by including the suitable docu-
mentation language in its collection letter, its reliance on Castro v.
ARS National Services, Inc.2 71 did not tell the whole story. The collec-
tor in Castro had provided the same guidance about suitable documen-
tation to the consumer, and the court also found a violation of
§ 1692g(a)(3). 2 72 The Castro court was concerned that the consumer
might be deprived of his opportunity to dispute the debt if he could not
produce suitable documentation within thirty days to support his de-
nial of the debt collector's claim.273 This was all well and good. But in
explaining the statutory requirements for disputing the debt, the
court stated that "[tihe statute simply requires that the consumer sub-
267. 183 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Haw. 2002).
268. See id. at 1236. The collector designated the following documentation as suitable:
" A copy of the front and back of the processed payment
" A final billing statement (with the original account number refer-
enced) showing a zero balance
" A dated letter from the original creditor advising the balance is zero
" A letter from the original creditor or credit bureau agency stating the
debt has been removed from their records
" A letter from the original creditor stating the dispute was resolved in
your favor
* Legal document(s) providing a discharged bankruptcy
Id.
269. Id. at 1240.
270. That obligation arises under § 1692g(a)(4), not § 1692g(a)(3).
271. No. 99 Civ. 4596, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2618 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000).
272. See id. at *10-11.
273. Id.
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mit a writing stating that all or a portion of a debt is disputed."2 74
This statement was all the more perplexing because the court had al-
ready noted in another part of its opinion its agreement with the con-
clusion in Ong v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc.27 5 that a
consumer could orally dispute the debt if it wanted to remove the
debt's presumptive validity.2 76 The Castro court must have intended
to make the point that if the consumer disputed the debt in writing
(though not required to do so), he did not have to give supplementary
documentation to bolster his objections to the debt collector's claim.
The court acknowledged that the collection letter did not require the
debtor to dispute the debt in writing.27 7 The debtor could have elected
to notify the collector of his position by telephone. 278 Although the
Sambor and Castro courts were clear on the point that no documenta-
tion was required for the debt to be disputed, the Castro court con-
fused matters by seeming to impose a writing in § 1692g(a)(3), 2 79
while at the same time conceding agreement with the Ong court on
the proper place for an oral dispute.
Another variation on the theme occurred in McCabe v. Crawford &
Co.280 The collector there tried to discharge its § 1692g(a)(4) obliga-
tion by using the following language: "In the event you contact us and
dispute the charges owed, we will promptly furnish you with any and
all documentation to substantiate the claim."28 1 Although the statute
requires the debt collector to notify the consumer that the consumer
must dispute the debt in writing if he seeks verification of the debt,282
the debt collector tried to facilitate matters by not limiting the con-
sumer to the written word.2 83 In this respect, the debt collector be-
lieved that it had honored the spirit of the statute, because it was
willing to verify the debt even if the consumer did not go to the trouble
of communicating in writing. 28 4 The debt collector was proud of its
274. Id. at *11.
275. No. 98-CV-5117, 1999 WL 51816 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999).
276. Castro, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2618, at *9 n.2.
277. Id. at *9.
278. Id.
279. The court stated, "[tihe statute simply requires that the consumer submit a writ-
ing stating that all or a portion of a debt is disputed." Id. at *11.
280. 272 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
281. Id. at 738.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000).
283. The collector took the position that it was willing to verify the debt if the debtor
gave only oral notification that he was disputing the debt. McCabe, 272 F. Supp.
2d at 742. The collector believed that by allowing the debtor the luxury of giving
either oral or written notification, the collector had gone "above and beyond its
duty." Id.
284. The collector used the following language in its letter:
Unless we hear from you within thirty (30) days after the receipt of
this letter disputing this claim, Federal Law provides that this debt will
be assumed to be valid and owing. In the event you contact us and dis-
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generosity in giving the consumer an option that § 1692g(a)(4) did not
provide.
There was no way of avoiding the plain language of § 1692g(a)(4)
this time around. The section required written notice, and the debt
collector therefore had to notify the consumer about this.285 The stat-
ute does not, however, prevent the collector from providing verifica-
tion of the debt if it wants to do so upon the consumer's oral request.
But once the debt collector follows the statutory prescription and the
consumer disputes the debt in writing, the collector must provide ver-
ification. Therefore, in McCabe, the debt collector did not effectively
convey the consumer's statutory rights.28 6
D. Disputing the Debt or Any Part Thereof
The validation section gives a consumer the right to dispute "the
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof." Some debt collectors are
not always careful about making it clear that a consumer can question
any part of the debt.287 In McCabe, the debt collector gave a break-
down of the debt and advised the consumer of the right to dispute the
"claim" and the "charges."2 88 The debt collector had hoped that the
court would infer a correlation between the itemized parts of the debt
and the consumer's right to dispute the debt.289 It was a chance not
worth taking, since the statute makes it clear that the consumer's
right to dispute extends to any part of the debt.290 It is not obvious
why the debt collector did not want to take the statutory command at
face value, but preferred instead to use language that created doubt
about whether the debt collector had met the statutory objective. The
debt collector obviously wanted to convey the impression that the con-
sumer could dispute any portion of the "claim" or of the "charges." By
pute the charges owed, we will promptly furnish you with any and all
documentation to substantiate the claim.
Id. at 738. The words "hear" and "contact" in this context certainly sent a mes-
sage that a writing was not necessary.
285. The court pointed out that "[a]lthough a debt collector may provide verification
upon oral notification, the debt collector must provide verification upon written
notification." Id. at 743. The collector must therefore follow the statutory man-
date if it wants to protect the consumer's right to obtain verification.
286. Id.; see also Grief v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 336, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that a collector violated the statute
when its letter did not inform the consumer that any notice about her disputing
the debt must be in writing).
287. Both § 1692g(a)(3) and § 1692g(a)(4) indicate that a consumer has the right to
dispute the debt or any portion thereof.
288. 272 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
289. See id. at 744. The collection letter reflected the balance due as $12,266.67, com-
prised of physical damage of $6,347.78, loss of use at $1,680, and the collector's
fee of $4,088.89. Id. at 738 n.2.
290. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)-(4) (2000).
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avoiding the statutory language, the debt collector faced an uphill
struggle in trying to convince the court that a "claim" meant the total
debt or any part thereof.
One would have thought that the debt collector in McCabe had
learned something from the debt collector's experience in Baker U.
G. C. Services Corp., 2 9 1 where it studiously avoided referring to any
portion of the debt. Instead, the debt collector promised verification of
the debt if the consumer requested it in writing within thirty days. 2 9 2
Otherwise, the debt collector assumed the debt to be valid.2 93 There
was nothing in the collection language to indicate that the consumer
had a right to dispute part of the debt.294 Although the collection let-
ters did indicate that the debt collector would provide verification on
the consumer's request, they did not make it clear that the consumer
had a right to dispute the entire debt, far less any portion thereof.295
It was left to the consumer to read between the lines. Without a clear
reference to any portion of the debt, a consumer would hardly know
that he could challenge finance charges or interest, and thus require
the collector to verify them in the same way as if the consumer was
querying the entire debt.296 The collectors in McCabe and Baker re-
jected the clear statutory language in favor of an alternative that did
not convey the right message. The statute requires notice to the con-
sumer that any portion of the debt may be challenged, and yet the
debt collectors felt comfortable with a reference to the "claim,"297 the
"charges,"298 and the "debt."299 It was hardly surprising, therefore,
that the courts held that the debt collectors had fallen short of their
statutory obligation. There was no way of construing those terms to
cover any portion of the debt, and, once again, the debt collectors re-
fused to take their cue from the statutory language.
291. 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
292. The collection letter contained the following statement: "Verification of this debt,
a copy of judgment or the name and address of the original creditor, if different
from the current creditor, will be provided if requested in writing within 30 days.
Otherwise, the debt will be assumed to be valid." Id. at 778.
293. Id.
294. Strictly speaking, the FDCPA gives the consumer the right to dispute the debt, or
any portion thereof. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)-(4). The collector's obligation to ver-
ify ensues from the consumer's disputing the debt in writing. It is not clear that
the consumer has an absolute right to seek verification, absent a notice to the
collector that the consumer disputes the debt. Thus, the collector in Baker left
the consumer in the lurch, not only with respect to the right to dispute the entire
debt, but also any portion thereof.
295. The collector did not mention the word "dispute" or any synonym thereof in its
letter. See Baker, 677 F.2d at 778. The collector promised verification of the debt
if the consumer requested it. Id.
296. Id.
297. McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
298. Id.
299. Baker, 677 F.2d at 778.
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If the debt collectors in McCabe and Baker missed the mark, the
debt collector in Smith v. Transworld Systems, Inc.30 0 tried its best
not to do so by at least referring to "portions" of the claim in its collec-
tion message. 30 1 The debt collector advised the consumer that "[a]ll
portions of [the] claim [would] be assumed valid unless disputed
within thirty days."30 2 It was easier for the Smith court to find that if
the assumption of validity affected all portions, then the consumer
should know that he could dispute any part of the debt.303 The debt
collector did not suffer, despite its abridgement of the statutory lan-
guage, but it must have been grateful for the court's liberal interpreta-
tion. After all, "all portions" must mean the entire debt, and therefore
a liberal interpretation of the debt collector's language suggested that
the debt collector was not addressing the constituent elements of the
debt.304
E. The Amount of the Debt
A collector must inform the debtor of the amount of the debt.305
This requirement seems plain enough, and yet it has proved to be a
challenge from time to time. In Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick,
Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C. ,306 the debt collector's dunning letter
informed the consumer about the "unpaid principal balance," but it
was careful to point out that such a figure did not include unpaid in-
terest and other charges that would be necessary to pay the loan.
3 0 7
The Seventh Circuit found that the debt collector had failed to comply
300. 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992).
301. Id. at 1029.
302. Id.
303. The Smith court construed the collector's language as follows:
Though Smith correctly notes that Transworld's wording does not specif-
ically state that a portion of the debt may be contested, Transworld's
letter adequately informs the reader that the debt must be disputed, if at
all, within thirty days-it is implicit that the claim can be wholly, or
partially, challenged.
Id.
304. The collector in Smith managed to avoid a violation, because the word "dispute"
or some variation thereof appeared in its collection letter. See id. at 1029. Never-
theless, the court still had to rely on the implicitness of the collector's language
that a claim could be partially challenged. See id. It is arguable that the as-
sumption that all portions of the debt should be deemed valid unless disputed can
mean that the dispute must relate to "all portions." In Baker, the collector did
not mention the consumer's right to dispute the debt. 677 F.2d at 778. A similar
problem occurred in Spears v. Brennan, 745 N.E.2d 862, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
with the language, "verification of the debt . . .will be provided upon written
request... within 30 days[;] otherwise the debt will be assumed valid." The court
concluded as a matter of law that the collector's notice did not adequately advise
the consumer that he could dispute the debt.
305. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) (2000).
306. 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
307. Id. at 875.
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with the statute, because the unpaid principal balance was not really
the amount of the debt, and the statute clearly called for a disclosure
of the latter.308 The debt collector should have been able to glean from
the statutory language that it had to let the consumer know the
amount due on the date that the debt collector sent the letter.30 9 Al-
though the amount was subject to change, that possibility did not af-
fect the debt collector's statutory obligation to state the position as of
the date of its communication with the consumer. 3 10 The statement of
the exact amount due on that date gives the consumer the real pic-
ture, but it still leaves the door open for the debt collector to advise the
consumer that a future adjustment may be necessary for interest and
other charges when the consumer actually pays the debt.
Another debt collector ran into trouble with the language "remain-
ing principal balance." This time the Seventh Circuit in Veach v.
Sheeks 3 1 1 reverted to its safe harbor language in Miller that under-
scored the importance of revealing a precise figure for the amount due,
while leaving room for an explanation of the possibilities for
change. 3 12 The debt collector in Veach must have had a certain
penchant for precision, for it included in the remaining principal bal-
ance the amount of treble damages that might be recoverable under a
local statute, but that the court had not yet awarded.3 13 It seemed
that the debt collector wanted to alert the consumer to the worst-case
scenario. But the amount of the dishonored check constituting the
debt in question was only $350, and the debt collector had hoped, no
doubt, that by utilizing the treble damages remedy, it would have
prodded the consumer into action before it was too late.314 The debt
collector's statutory obligation is to inform the consumer about the
amount of the debt, and not to include other items that may subse-
308. Id.
309. See id. at 875-76.
310. Just as it did in Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1997), the Sev-
enth Circuit came to the rescue in Miller by providing a safe harbor formula for
stating the amount of the debt. It suggested the following language:
As of the date of this letter, you owe $ [the exact amount due]. Because
of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to
day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you
pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we
receive your check, in which event we will inform you before depositing
the check for collection.
Miller, 214 F.3d at 876.
311. 316 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2003).
312. See id. at 693 (citing Miller, 214 F.3d at 876).
313. Id. at 692.
314. The collector's notice of claim that accompanied the small claims court summons
indicated an indebtedness of $1,050 as treble damages for a bad check of $350,
plus attorney's fees as permitted by law. Id. at 693. The collection notice de-
scribed the debt as "'Remaining principal balance $1,050.00; plus reasonable at-
torney fees as permitted by law, and costs if allowed by the court.'" Id. at 692.
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quently be added thereto by a court.3 15 The debt collector's letter
must reflect the present state of affairs as far as the debt is concerned.
In Veach, the consumer could not be responsible for treble damages,
costs, or attorney's fees until the court had acted, and therefore the
debt collector misrepresented the amount of the debt.316
A debt collector may run afoul of the FDCPA not only by misstat-
ing the amount of the debt under § 1692g(a)(1), but also by attempting
to recover certain costs not "expressly authorized by the agreement
creating the debt or permitted by law."317 That was the situation in
Shula v. Lawent.3 18 The collector had taken some liberty in sending a
letter to the consumer that demanded payment of court costs. 3 19 The
applicable state law provided that court costs were recoverable when
the debt was settled before judgment. 3 20 Nevertheless, a court order
imposing such costs was still necessary if the debt collector expected to
recover them from the consumer. 32 1 Recovery of court costs was not
automatic simply because the transaction met the statutory require-
ments.3 22 The consumer did not yet have an obligation to pay costs,
and thus there was no authority for the debt collector to include them
in the debt allegedly owed by the consumer.
The debt collectors in Person v. Stupar, Schuster & Cooper, S.C.323
were in no better position when they tried to recover "the entire bal-
ance ... plus attorney's fees."3 24 The debt collectors had the benefit of
the Seventh Circuit's safe harbor letter in Miller,3 25 but nevertheless
did not seem to rely on it for guidance. They neither specified a pre-
cise amount nor informed the consumer that the amount owed was
315. See id. at 693; McDowall v. Leschack & Grodensky, P.C., 279 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
316. 316 F.3d at 693. The court explained, "[slince Veach cannot be held liable for
treble damages, court costs, or attorney's fees until there has been a judgment by
a court, they cannot be part of the 'remaining principal balance' of a claimed
debt." Id.
317. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) (2000).
318. 359 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has seen its fair share of collec-
tion strategists. In Chuway v. National Action Financial Services, Inc., 362 F.3d
944, 947-48 (7th Cir. 2004), the collector stated the balance in its letter, but then
advised the consumer to call for the "most current balance information." The
court held that the letter did not disclose "the amount of the debt" as required,
because it confused the consumer. Cf. Olson v. Risk Management Alternatives,
Inc., 366 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2004) (where the court interpreted the collector's dis-
closure of the amount of the debt as the balance and the amount "now due" as the
portion that the collector would currently accept in payment.
319. Shula, 359 F.3d at 490.
320. Id. at 491 (citing 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 425/8a-1(b) (2002)).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. 136 F. Supp. 2d 957 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
324. Id. at 959.
325. 214 F.3d 872, 876 (3d. Cir. 2000).
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subject to change.326 A consumer could have interpreted the debt col-
lectors' language to mean that he owed a "principal balance and an
indeterminate amount of attorney fees."327 This language was mis-
leading, because it detracted from the debt collectors' ability to give a
true picture of the consumer's liability under the transaction. The
consumer would not have known the amount due. Even if the debt
collectors thought that they had made a good attempt in the first para-
graph of their letter by stipulating the entire balance to be "$987.71,
plus attorney's fees," they failed miserably at compliance by exhorting
the consumer later in the same letter to pay $987.71 against the bal-
ance he owed. 328 This invitation seemed confusing, for it sent a mes-
sage that the identified figure might not be the true balance.3 29 The
debt collectors could not have it both ways. Their attempt to mimic
the safe harbor language in Bartlett was unsuccessful, since there was
no way of explaining the relation of the phrase "plus attorney's fees" to
the requirement of disclosing the amount due.330
Confusion takes many forms. In Sonmore v. Checkrite Recovery
Services, Inc.,331 the debt collectors went out of their way to provide
much information about their claim, but still left the consumer bewil-
dered about the amount of the debt. The dishonored check in conten-
tion there was for a mere two dollars, but the collectors' letter
contained two columns: one outlined the figures for a settlement offer
and the other contained the figures for the consumer's liability if ajudgment was entered. 33 2 The amount in the judgment column was
$210 more than that in the settlement offer, because it included collec-
326. Person, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 962.
327. Id. at 963.
328. See id.
329. The plaintiffs claim on this point was that the defendants' collection letter was
deceptive and misleading. Id. at 962.
330. The challenge in Bartlett was whether the collection letter was confusing, and
thus a violation of § 1692g(a). See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.
1997). In Person, the issue was whether the inclusion of the phrase "plus attor-
ney's fees" was misleading or deceptive under § 1692e. See 136 F. Supp. 2d at
964.
331. 187 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Minn. 2001).
332. The collector outlined its offer as follows:
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tion costs, civil theft damages, and court costs. 3 33 No one could accuse
the debt collectors of not being thorough, but when all was said and
done, the collectors' grand design did not give a clue about the amount
of the debt. It is true that both columns in the collection letter indi-
cated the amount of the dishonored check, but an unsophisticated con-
sumer would not find this arrangement particularly inviting.3 34 The
whole rationale for requiring a debt collector to disclose the amount of
the debt is to make sure that the consumer knows where he stands,
and therefore a collection letter should not leave the consumer
scratching his head over the collector's claim.3 35 The consumer should
know what the debt is, but this does not prevent the debt collector
from making an offer of settlement once the consumer has that infor-
mation. The debt collector should warn the consumer about potential
liabilities in Miller fashion, but the first order of business must be the
amount of the debt, which must be disclosed with precision as of a
specific date.33 6 In Sonmore, the collection letter gave no explanation
SETTLEMENT OFFER: POSSIBLE LIABILITY UNDER
STATE LAW IF A JUDGMENT
IS ENTERED:
Check No.: 1102 Check Amount: $2.00
Check Date: 11-05-98 Cost of Collection: $30.00
Merchant: Twin City Civil Penalty $100.00
Store # 520 (Maximum Allowed)
Check Amount: $2.00 Civil Theft $50.00
Damages:
Service Charge: $20.00 Court Costs: $150.00
Civil Penalty: $100.00 (filing fee and
estimated service
of process)
TOTAL TOTAL
SETTLEMENT OFFER: $122.00 POSSIBLE LIABILITY: $332.00
Id. at 1131.
333. See id.
334. The Eighth Circuit applies the standard of the "unsophisticated consumer" when
evaluating collection letters. See Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000).
That standard protects "the uninformed or naive consumer, yet also contains an
objective element of reasonableness to protect debt collectors from liability for
peculiar interpretations of collections letters." Id. at 874-75. In Duffy, the viola-
tion related to § 1692e(5) and § 1692f(1). See id. at 873.
335. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996), where the collector notified the
consumer of the right to dispute the debt, but then continued: "'If the above does
not apply to you, we shall expect payment or arrangement for payment within ten
(10) days from the date of this letter.'" Id. at 225. The court observed that the
unsophisticated consumer would be scratching his head when he received such a
letter because "[hie wouldn't have a clue as to what he was supposed to do before
real trouble begins." Id. at 226. See also Sonmore, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1136 (The
unsophisticated consumer would be uncertain of the amount of the debt when
presented with two columns of figures.).
336. In Miller, the court's safe harbor letter gave the amount due as of the date of the
collection letter. Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark,
L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000). In Bartlett, the safe harbor letter gave
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about the service charge, and did not say whether the consumer actu-
ally owed that amount. It was left up to the consumer to unravel the
mystery, an assignment that could hardly be justified under the
FDCPA.
Even when a debt collector does not use two columns to make its
point, it may still cause some difficulty for the consumer by using lan-
guage that does not identify the amount of the debt. In Armstrong v.
Rose Law Firm, P.A.,337 the collection letter listed the "amount re-
ferred" as $44.11, penalties of $100 and a settlement offer of
$144.11.338 While the statute required the debt collector to disclose
the amount of the debt, the debt collector opted for the "amount re-
ferred. 339 The collector must have viewed this phrase as synonymous
with the statutory terminology, and fully expected the consumer to
recognize the synonym as fulfilling the statutory demand. Although
the collection letter explained that the settlement offer included the
amount of the dishonored check and a service charge of $20, it did not
clarify whether the consumer actually owed the latter amount or
whether the debt included that service charge.340 It was left to the
consumer to make the computations if she eventually understood the
meaning of "amount referred." The statute did not impose this burden
on the consumer. It was up to the debt collector to clarify matters so
the amount due as of a specific date. See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th
Cir. 1997). The court in Jolly v. Shapiro, 237 F. Supp. 2d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2002),
found both approaches acceptable, the guiding principle being "whether the unso-
phisticated consumer could be confused." Id. at 893. This conclusion seems justi-
fied, because the Miller court did not restrict a collector to the precise language of
the safe harbor letter as long as the collection letter does not confuse the unso-
phisticated consumer. See 214 F.3d at 876.
337. No. 00-2287, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4039 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2002).
338. Id. at *8.
339. The court observed that "the unsophisticated consumer should not be required to
consult a dictionary to determine that 'amount referred' really means the debt
owed." Id. at *11. A consumer would have had to do a little subtraction to arrive
at the amount of the debt, an assignment not contemplated by the FDCPA. See
id. at *10. In Fuller v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Fla.
2002), the collection letter stated as follows: "For those of you have not paid since
1997 or prior, you must pay the amount of $75.00 for the last quarter of 1997,
$360.00 total for the four (4) quarters of 1998, $90.00 for the first quarter of 1999,
plus $50.00 for attorney fees for this collection letter .. " Id. at 1370. There was
no indication about how much the consumer owed or how he was to determine
that figure. It was not surprising, therefore, that the court found that the collec-
tor failed to comply with § 1692g(a)(1) by not stating the amount of the debt. See
id. See also Grief v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 336, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that a notice stating that the con-
sumer owed "'$1,962.87 plus attorneys' fees up to $294.43"' violated
§ 1692g(a)(1), because the notice presented the least sophisticated consumer with
"a variety of amounts of the debt, rather than simply the amount of the debt").
340. See Armstrong, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4039, at *10; see also Sonmore,. 187 F.
Supp. 2d at 1137 (A "debt collector must be explicit regarding the amount
owed.").
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that the consumer would not have any doubt about the amount of the
debt.
Even when the amount of the debt is not in contention, a debt col-
lector may try to recover an amount not permitted by law.3 41 In John-
son v. Riddle,342 a collector tried to collect a statutory shoplifting fee
of $250 on a dishonored check rather than a service charge of $15.343
The collector had a choice between the penalty under a shoplifting
statute and the penalty under a dishonored check statute. He chose
the former because it gave him a greater recovery. Nevertheless, the
court held that the specific statute relating to dishonored checks
trumped the shoplifting statute when the collector tried to recover a
penalty for a dishonored check. 344 This was not surprising, because
the shoplifting statute required the debt collector to show that the con-
sumer had not purchased goods from the seller, but had taken them
from the seller's premises without permission.3 45 But the consumer's
tendering of a check in exchange for goods was by all means a
purchase within the meaning of the state statute covering shoplifting,
and there was no way of avoiding the application of the statute relat-
ing to dishonored checks. 34 6 The collector's reliance on the shoplifting
statute to obtain a greater penalty therefore constituted a violation of
341. It is an unfair practice for a collector to collect any amount not "expressly author-
ized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f(1) (2000).
342. 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002).
343. Id. at 1112.
344. Id. at 1119-20. The Johnson court gave some guidance about when an amount is
"permitted by law" under § 1692f(1) by stating as follows:
We hold that an amount is "permitted by law" within the meaning of the
FDCPA if state supreme court holdings establish that collection of the
amount is lawful. Absent state supreme court holdings on point, we fol-
low our familiar Erie analysis by predicting what the state supreme
court would hold, or, in the appropriate case, certifying the issue to the
state supreme court.
Id. at 1119. The application of this federal statute required the court to look to
tle meaning of "permitted by law" under state law as announced by the state's
highest court. See Commission v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 457, 465 (1967). Al-
though the Utah Supreme Court had never dealt with the applicability of the
shoplifting statute to dishonored checks, it had previously held that specific stat-
utes took precedence over general statutes, and therefore the dishonored check
statute would be applicable. See Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1996).
345. The Utah statute defines the "wrongful taking of merchandise" within the shop-
lifting statute as "the taking of merchandise that has not been purchased from a
merchant's premises without the permission of the merchant or one of his em-
ployees, servants or agents." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-14(5) (2002).
346. There was no doubt that the consumer had purchased the goods within the mean-
ing of the state statute, because a purchaser includes someone who acquires
goods by means of a check that is later dishonored. Id. § 70A-2-403.
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the FDCPA because it was an attempt to collect an amount not per-
mitted by law.3 4 7
V. BONA FIDE ERROR DEFENSE
Even when a collector violates the FDCPA, it still has a last chance
to avoid liability if it can show that its violation was unintentional and
that it resulted from a bona fide error that occurred despite the fact
that the debt collector had procedures in place to detect it.348 The
Truth in Lending Act349 contains similar language, but goes further.
It specifically excludes errors in legal judgment from the bona fide er-
ror defense.3 50 The FDCPA does not contain that exclusionary lan-
guage in its bona fide error provision. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the courts disagree about the application of the defense to mis-
takes of law.
Even before the Truth in Lending Act was amended in 1980 to em-
phasize that the defense could not be applied to errors of law,351 the
courts had routinely taken that route by limiting it to clerical and cal-
culation-type errors.3 52 The similarity of the FDCPA language made
it easy for the courts to apply the same rule to the defense in the col-
lection context.3 53 Debt collectors did not garner much sympathy
from the early cases, because the law seemed clear, and the courts
were not minded to forgive the collectors' mistakes. For example, in
Baker v. G. C. Services Corp.,354 the collector failed to notify the con-
347. See Johnson, 305 F.3d at 1120; see also Irwin v. Mascott, 112 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that collecting a shoplifting penalty for violation of dis-
honored check statute violates the FDCPA); Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp.
1320, 1328 (D. Utah 1997) (holding that the collector violated the statute by try-
ing to recover more than a $15 fee for dishonored checks).
348. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2000).
349. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (2000)).
350. The bona fide error provision in the Truth in Lending Act provides that "an error
of legal judgment with respect to a person's obligations . . . is not a bona fide
error." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (2000).
351. See Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615,
94 Stat. 168, 180-81 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000)).
352. See Henning v. Daniels, 653 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1981); Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522
F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161
(7th Cir. 1974); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chemi-
cal Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); RALPH J.
ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 12.0512] (2000).
353. See Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22 (2d. Cir. 1989); Baker
v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1982); Rutyna v. Collection
Accounts Terminal, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 980, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1979); FAIR DEBT COL-
LECTION, supra note 89, §7.5.4.
354. 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
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sumer that the latter could dispute any portion of the debt.355 The
debt collector, relying on its counsel, advised the consumer that it
would verify the debt if requested to do so; otherwise it would assume
the debt to be valid.356 The debt collector did not pay any attention to
the phrase "any portion thereof," even though the statute clearly cov-
ered it.357 This was not an isolated instance. The Eighth Circuit in
Hulshizer v. Global Credit Services, Inc.35 8 did not forgive the debt
collector's failure to inform the consumer in the collection letter that
the debt collector was trying to collect a debt.359 There was no doubt
about the statutory requirements at that time. The collector had to
make it clear in all communications that it was trying to collect a
debt."360 These are but two examples of the courts' unwillingness to
recognize errors of law as a bona fide defense. The courts were per-
suaded that they should follow the judicial trend in holding that simi-
lar language in the Truth in Lending statute did not recognize
mistakes of law as a valid defense. It must be remembered that Con-
gress had amended that statute in 1980 to make it quite clear that it
did not apply to such errors. 36 1 The Truth in Lending amendment did
not have a profound effect on the FDCPA scene, because lawyers were
exempt from that statute until 1986, and therefore the courts were not
much concerned with mistakes of law.362 With the exemption re-
moved, lawyers found themselves subject to liability for violations of
the FDCPA, and, thus, they became more interested in the bona fide
error defense. The courts then had to face the question of whether the
FDCPA allows the defense, since, unlike the Truth in Lending statute,
the FDCPA contains no specific language addressing the matter.
355. The collector's notice failed to inform the consumer that he could dispute not only
the entire debt, but also any portion thereof as required by § 1692g(a)(4). Id. at
777.
356. Id. at 776-77.
357. The court held that "[rieliance on advice of counsel or a mistake about the law is
insufficient by itself to raise the bona fide error defense." Id. at 779.
358. 728 F.2d 1037 (8th Cir. 1984).
359. See id. at 1038.
360. A 1996 amendment to the FDCPA requires this disclosure only in the collector's
initial communication, and not in subsequent communications. See Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 2035(a), 110 Stat. 3009-425 (1996) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)
(2000)); see also FAIR DEBT COLLECTION, supra note 89, § 5.5.14.1 & n.677.
361. See Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615,
94 Stat. 168, 180-81 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000)).
362. The FDCPA originally exempted "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an at-
torney on behalf of and in the name of a client." Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875 (1977). Congress removed
that exemption in 1986. See Act of July 9, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat.
768.
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When the Supreme Court decided Heintz v. Jenkins3 63 in 1995, it
left the impression that there was no problem in applying the bona
fide error defense to lawyers. The Court was then responding to the
petitioners' claim that the FDCPA should not apply to litigation, be-
cause a lawyer who brought a losing claim would always be liable for
bringing an action that could not legally be taken. 36 4 The Court's re-
assurance that statutory protection was available to litigating lawyers
was sure to calm the collectors' fears about the availability of the de-
fense. But the Court may have been just trying to point out that a
litigator would not be defenseless if he brought an unsuccessful suit,
because the bona fide error provision would be there to protect him.365
The Court did not go further and specify the types of mistakes that it
had in mind. After all, the Court was considering only whether the
term "debt collector" applied to a lawyer who regularly litigated to col-
lect debts.366 It was not concerned about whether a lawyer could as-
sert the bona fide error defense in the case of a legal error.
It was only when the Seventh Circuit took up the consumer's claim
in Jenkins v. Heintz36 7 that the matter of legal judgment took center
stage. The consumer complained about a settlement letter from the
collector that contained a claim for forced placed insurance premiums
not authorized by the loan agreement. 368 The consumer took the view
that the debt collectors had used legal judgment in trying to collect
these unauthorized premiums, and that they could not use the bona
fide error defense against her.3 69
The court noted that "errors in legal judgment are not an issue
simply because the collectors are attorneys."370 It was possible, there-
fore, for an attorney to benefit from the bona fide error defense, even
though he committed a collection error that did not involve legal judg-
363. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
364. See id. at 295. The Sixth Circuit in Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18, 21 (6th Cir.
1993), made the point that if the FDCPA applied to litigating activities, a lawyer
would be in trouble if he brought a losing claim against a consumer, because he
would have taken an action that could not legally be taken. The Sixth Circuit's
view conflicted with that of the Seventh Circuit in Heintz and the Supreme Court
mentioned the possibility of the bona fide error defense being available to the
losing lawyer in this context. See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295.
365. The Court stated that it did not see how "the fact that a lawsuit turns out ulti-
mately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an 'action that
cannot legally be taken.'" Id. at 296.
366. The issue was "whether the term 'debt collector' in the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act ... applies to a lawyer who 'regularly,' through litigation, tries to collect
consumer debts." Id. at 292.
367. 124 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 1997).
368. Id. at 827. The consumer's contention was that the debt collectors had violated
§ 1692f by using "unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
[the] debt" and § 1692e by falsely representing the character of the debt. Id.
369. See id. at 832.
370. Id.
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ment. Thus, while paying lip service to the availability of the defense
for legal errors, 3 71 the court then acknowledged that it was not deal-
ing in Jenkins with a legal error. 37 2 The debt collectors had merely
sought to recover the insurance premiums, which their bank client be-
lieved to be due. The debt collectors did not have a legal obligation to
determine the validity of the bank's claim just because they were law-
yers, and therefore a mistake about the claim did not make it a bona
fide legal error.37 3 The debt collectors did not know that their client
was buying financial risk insurance that was not authorized by the
loan agreement. 3 74 Therefore, they did not have to make an indepen-
dent analysis of their client's claim in order to depend on the bona fide
error defense. If the debt collectors were not lawyers, they would have
no such obligation. 3 75 It was clear to the court that a lawyer-collector
should not have an obligation to look behind the creditor's claim, be-
cause to do so would make the application of the bona fide error de-
fense depend on the collector's identity.
In Heintz, the Supreme Court did not conclude that lawyers could
use the bona fide error defense for legal mistakes. It merely observed
that lawyers who mistakenly brought a lawsuit were not helpless in
the face of the statutory defense, but the Court did not pause long
enough to explain whether it was referring to both legal and nonlegal
grounds. 37 6 After all, it is possible for a lawyer to litigate during the
collection process on the basis of some clerical error that informs her
decision to proceed. The Court had to deal with the debt collector's
contention that applying the FDCPA to lawyers would make them lia-
ble anytime they brought a lawsuit against a consumer and lost.3 77
This was the debt collector's way of convincing the Court that the
FDCPA should not be applied to lawyers, because otherwise lawyers
would be severely handicapped in their litigation activities. The Court
had to allay the collector's fears in some way, and it therefore referred
to the bona fide error defense, not as a panacea for all the lawyer's
mistakes, but rather as a defense in appropriate cases. 3 78 The Court
did not deem it necessary to go further than that. But it did make the
point that bringing a losing lawsuit did not necessarily mean that the
371. See id. & n.7.
372. See id. at 832.
373. The court did not want to impose a duty on the lawyer-collector to conduct an
independent investigation into the legal intricacies of the contract between the
creditor and the consumer. The statute does not impose such a duty on the aver-
age collector, and thus such a requirement would create a double standard for the
bona fide error defense on the basis of the collector's identity. See id. at 833-34.
374. Id. at 832.
375. See id. at 833-34.
376. See 514 U.S. 291, 295 (1995).
377. See id.
378. See id.
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lawyer had taken action that could not legally be taken. 37 9 If the law-
yer-collector made a mistake in compiling information, her suit would
be based on inaccurate data, but there would be no basis for alleging
that she did not take the action legally.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Heintz did not escape the Tenth
Circuit's notice in Johnson v. Riddle.380 The Johnson court inter-
preted the Heintz dictum as supporting the defense in some cases
when a lawyer tries to collect an amount exceeding that owed by the
debtor.38 1 But such an interpretation makes an assumption that the
Supreme Court itself was unwilling to make. The mere fact that "a
lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful [cannot], by itself,
make the bringing of it an 'action that cannot legally be taken."' 38 2
There was no need to assume that a lawyer would always be liable
just because he lost his case. The Johnson court concluded that the
bona fide error defense should be available for mistakes of law, since a
lawyer-collector can commit a legal mistake when he sues for an
amount not legally owed by the consumer. 38 3
Ordinary debt collectors are protected when they go about their
collection business relying on the information obtained from their cli-
ents. 38 4 It is argued, therefore, that a lawyer should enjoy the same
protection when she asserts a bona fide claim for a client which a court
ultimately rejects. 3 85 The basis of this argument is that the language
of the FDCPA, unlike that in Truth in Lending, does not pretend to
limit the defense to clerical errors. The absence of such language
lends credibility to the contention that Congress did not intend to
limit the defense in this way. It is noteworthy, however, that when
Congress enacted the FDCPA, it included the same original Truth in
Lending language that courts had consistently accepted as addressing
379. The Court was looking for something else beside the lack of success in bringing
the suit. The failure to win "by itself" could not turn the action into one "that
[could not] legally be taken." Id. at 296.
380. 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002). On remand, the district court found that the debt
collectors had established all three elements of the bona fide error defense. The
error was unintentional, bona fide, and the collectors had reasonable procedures
in place to avoid the error. See Johnson v. Riddle, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. Utah
2003).
381. See Johnson, 305 F.3d at 1123.
382. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296.
383. The Johnson court referred to the FDCPA's legislative history to bolster its posi-
tion that the defense covers any type of bona fide error. "A debt collector has no
liability, however, if he violates the act in any manner, including with regard to
the act's coverage, when such violation is unintentional and occurred despite pro-
cedures designed to avoid such violations." 305 F.3d at 1123 (quoting S. REP. No.
95-382, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700).
384. See Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992); Jenkins v.
Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
385. See Taylor v. Luper, Sheriff & Neidenthal Co., 74 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Ohio
1999).
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only clerical errors. 38 6 It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that
when Congress subsequently included the same language in the
FDCPA, it wanted to adopt the established judicial interpretation that
courts had accepted in the Truth in Lending context. 38 7 Congress cre-
ated some doubt about its intent when it included in the 1980 amend-
ments some specific language excluding mistakes of law from Truth in
Lending coverage, 38 8 but left intact the original FDCPA language.
One interpretation of the congressional action is that Congress specifi-
cally adopted the judicial construction of the Truth in Lending statute,
not that it rejected such construction for the FDCPA.389 Congress ad-
ded the additional language to the Truth in Lending statute as part of
an overall strategy to simplify the statute in 1980. It was not the only
section affected by this congressional tinkering. Congress may have
seen no need to make a simultaneous amendment to the FDCPA if the
courts had all along been treating the two provisions the same way.
The congressional failure to address the FDCPA provision has en-
couraged some courts to emphasize the difference in language as a
basis for distinguishing the two statutes.
The legislative history of the FDCPA sheds little light on the mat-
ter. It merely mirrors the statutory language without making any dis-
tinction between legal and clerical errors. When Congress passed the
Act in 1977, the Truth in Lending Act was already in force with the
same language relating to errors, and Congress would have been
aware then how the courts were interpreting the Truth in Lending
provision. 390 One cannot say that Congress was trying to correct judi-
cial interpretation when it revised Truth in Lending in 1980, for the
same explanatory language that it used in the amended section con-
firmed what the courts had been doing all along. Congress could have
clarified matters by saying something about the FDCPA provision
that dealt with the same bona fide error defense. It made no sweeping
386. See Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., Inc., 654 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981); Ives v. W.T. Grant
Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d
1161 (7th Cir. 1974); Houston v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 414 F. Supp.
851 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Gillard v. Aetna Fin. Co., 414 F. Supp. 737 (D. La. 1976).
387. See Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 510 (1960) (presuming that congres-
sional adoption of the same language indicates an intent to accept judicial con-
struction thereof).
388. Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act in 1980 to provide that "an error of
legal judgment with respect to a person's obligations . . . is not a bona fide error."
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615, 94
Stat. 168, 180-81 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000)).
389. See FAIR DEBT COLLECTION, supra note 89, § 7.5.4, at 331.
390. The Senate Report on the FDCPA stated as follows: "A debt collector has no lia-
bility, however, if he violates the act in any manner, including with regard to the
act's coverage, when such violation is unintentional and occurred despite proce-
dures designed to avoid such violations." S. REP. No. 95-382, at 5 (1977), re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700.
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changes in that statute along the lines of the Truth in Lending simpli-
fication. It must have thought that the previous consistency in judi-
cial interpretation would continue even with the Truth in Lending
clarification.
It has been suggested that a collection lawyer might expose himself
to liability by zealously advocating a position on behalf of his client
which turns out to be wrong.39 1 If this is a concern in the FDCPA
context, one wonders why there would not be the same concern for
Truth in Lending. In any event, lack of success in a lawsuit does not
mean that the collector took action that could not legally be taken.39 2
If a lawyer-collector takes action that is clearly in violation of the law,
the courts do not see any need to be sympathetic to his cause. In Picht
v. Jon R. Hawks, Ltd.,393 the collector made a mistake in applying
Minnesota's garnishment statute, despite ample state authority limit-
ing prejudgment garnishment to liquidated debts. The collector
sought refuge in the bona fide error defense without success, for the
court elected to follow Eighth Circuit precedent in restricting the de-
fense to clerical errors. 39 4 The debt collector had threatened to take
action that it could not legally take.3 95 It took a chance that its collec-
tion strategy would have a direct influence on the consumer. This was
not a case where the law was unclear. 396 The collector knew full well
that it could not recover any penalties that were not judicially sanc-
tioned. It was not surprising, therefore, that the court reached the
conclusion that it did.
The trend of the cases is to deny the defense for mistakes of law.397
The lack of sympathy for legal errors probably results from the fact
391. See Taylor v. Luper, Sheriff& Niedenthal Co., 74 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (S.D. Ohio
1999).
392. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
393. 236 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2001).
394. See id. at 451 (citing Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037, 1038
(8th Cir. 1984)).
395. The collector attempted to use the garnishment procedure before judgment was
entered as required by the Minnesota statute. See Picht, 236 F.3d at 451.
396. See Janet Flaccus, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Lawyers and the Bona Fide
Error Defense, 2001 ARK. L. NOTES 95, 99. The collector had as precedent two
cases from the Minnesota Supreme Court that allowed prejudgment garnishment
only when the parties are dealing with a definite contractual sum. See MacKen-
zie v. Belisle, 338 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. 1983); Sommers v. Thomas, 88 N.W.2d 191
(Minn. 1958). In Picht, there was no sum certain or definite, because the collector
wanted to recover statutory penalties, and those were subject to the court's dis-
cretion. See 236 F.3d at 450.
397. See Picht, 236 F.3d 446; Pipiles v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 886 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989);
Hulshizer, 728 F.2d 1037; Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir.
1982); Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (W.D. Wis.
2002); Withers v. Equifax Risk Mgmt. Servs., 40 F. Supp. 2d 978 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
But see Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 1997) (dictum); Taylor v. Luper,
Sheriff& Niedenthal, Co., 74 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Fair Debt Collec-
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that collectors are not afraid to use aggressive tactics in the collection
process. 39 s If they cross the line sometimes, they hope that the bona
fide error defense will bail them out. If a debt collector makes a cleri-
cal error, the defense is readily available once the collector meets the
other statutory criteria. The debt collector that is in doubt about any
part of the FDCPA can always seek guidance from the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"). 3 9 9 In that event, the collector will be protected if
a court subsequently disagrees with the FTC's position on any issue.
The collector will enjoy this protection as long as it acts in good faith
in conformity with the FTC's advisory opinion. This safe harbor provi-
sion is related more to questions of law, and does not detract from the
bona fide error defense for clerical errors that is otherwise available
under the statute.
It is not unusual to find a collector asserting a bona fide error de-
fense because it has devised its own method of compliance in the face
of clear statutory direction. In Wilkerson v. Bowman,40 0 the collection
letter indicated a balance of $3,484.02 (less applicable rebate), with
attorney's fees up to $350 and twenty percent interest per annum
from February 4, 2000.401 The only problem was that the statute re-
quired the collector to state the amount of the debt.402 The debt col-
tion Practices Act: The Bona Fide Error Defense, CONSUMER CREDIT AND TRUTH-
IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Aug. 2002, at 2-3.
398. The statute was intended "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000). Allowing a debt collector to use the bona
fide error defense for legal mistakes might prevent consumers from coming for-
ward with their claims. If the defense is not available, adventurous attorneys
will carefully consider their clients' positions before bringing suit. See FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION, supra note 89, § 7.5.4., at 332.
399. The FTC will issue a formal advisory opinion when "[tihe matter involves a sub-
stantial or novel question of fact or law and there is no clear Commission or court
precedent" or in a case where "the subject matter ... is of significant public inter-
est." 16 C.F.R § 1.1(a) (2004). A collector will have no liability for "any act done
or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the [FTC]." 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2000). The FTC issued its first formal advisory opinion in
2000 in response to a letter from the American Collectors Association. See FTC
Advisory Opinion from Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Basil J.
Mezines (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter FTC Advisory Opinion], at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2000/04/fdcpaadvisoryopinion.htm. The FTC also issues informal staff let-
ters for the guidance of the collection industry, but they provide no defense to
collectors as the formal advisory opinions do under § 1692k(e). See FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION, supra note 89, § 3.2.5, at 65-66. A collector can also seek guidance
from the FTC Staff Commentary, which was published in 1988. See FTC Staff
Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097 (Dec. 13, 1988). The Commentary does not
bind the FTC, the courts, or the public and is not entitled to any deference when
it conflicts with the statutory language. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291
(1995); FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. at 50,101.
400. 200 F.R.D. 605 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
401. Id. at 606.
402. The written notice that a debt collector must give to the consumer must state,
among other things, "the amount of the debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) (2000).
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lectors thought they could rationalize their imprecision, because they
intended to collect the principal only, and the other categories men-
tioned in the letter did not affect the principal amount due. 40 3 Al-
though the collectors' clients provided the information about the
transaction, the collectors made the decision about the contents of the
collection letter.404 They could not, therefore, attribute the disqualify-
ing disclosure to the client. The unpaid principal balance was not the
debt, but really only a part thereof, and even though the amount owed
would change daily, this did not prevent the collectors from disclosing
the amount due as of the date of the letter.405
This mistake was reminiscent of other collection mistakes that did
not persuade the courts to accept the bona fide error defense. In one
case, 40 6 the statute required a collector to disclose in all communica-
tions that the collector was attempting to collect a debt.407 Neverthe-
less, the collector ignored the clear statutory language and left out the
language in its communication with the consumer, relying instead on
the informal advice of an FTC attorney.40 8 In another case,40 9 the
statute required the collector to notify the consumer that the con-
sumer could dispute the debt "or any portion thereof," and yet the col-
lector neglected to convey that message. 4 10 The collector left the
consumer in doubt about the consumer's right to dispute a part of the
debt. Even if the courts were sympathetic to the debt collectors in
these cases, they could hardly be faulted for rejecting the mistake of
law defense. The clarity of the FDCPA provision left the courts with
the impression that the debt collectors wanted to use their creative
talents to comply with the statute in their own inimitable way. So,
the statutory directive for the collector to make a certain disclosure in
all communications did not, in the collector's scheme of things, require
strict adherence to the format. It makes one wonder whether most of
403. Wilkerson, 200 F.R.D. at 607.
404. Id. at 608.
405. See id. at 607; see also Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, &
Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2000).
406. Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037 (8th Cir. 1984).
407. Before 1996, the FDCPA required this disclosure. See Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 807(11), 91 Stat. 874, 878 (1977). -As a result of a
1996 amendment, this disclosure is required in the initial written notice only.
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 2305, 110 Stat. 3009-425 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)
(2000)).
408. See Hulshizer, 728 F.2d at 1038. The court made the point that the FTC staff
letter was not the same as an FTC advisory opinion and therefore was not bind-
ing on the FTC. See id. The statutory language was unambiguous and the collec-
tor could not disregard it. See id.
409. Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
410. The language "or any portion thereof" appears in both § 1692g(a)(3) and
§ 1692g(a)(4), so there could hardly be any doubt about that disclosure require-
ment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)-(a)(4) (2000).
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these mistakes result from a debt collector's failure to understand the
intricacies of the law, or whether they simply reflect a collector's lack
of enthusiasm for literal adherence to the statutory language.
Even in those cases where a court is willing to assume that a legal
mistake can qualify as a bona fide error, it may nevertheless not grant
relief to the collector when the error plainly contravenes judicial pre-
cedent. In Nielsen v. Dickerson,4 11 the attorney-collector did not have
any meaningful involvement with the letters that went out under his
name, and the court regarded them as false and misleading. It was
not as if the collector was operating in a vacuum, for the Seventh Cir-
cuit had left no doubt in Avila v. Rubin412 about the role of a lawyer in
the collection process. In Nielsen, the bank selected the debtors who
would receive the attorney's letter, provided the information that the
attorney required, and handled the responses to the attorney's let-
ter.4 13 It was clear, therefore, that the debt collector used the attor-
ney's letterhead without the attorney's meaningful involvement in the
collection process. Even though the court assumed that a legal mis-
take could qualify as a bona fide error under the FDCPA, it could not
bring itself to accept the collector's excuses in this context.4 14 It was
not as if the collector was operating on a clean slate. The Seventh
Circuit had already spoken when faced with similar facts, and the col-
lector should have taken the hint and responded accordingly.
The Seventh Circuit had similarly avoided the application of the
legal error defense in Jenkins, because it believed that the collector
had not exercised legal judgment.4 15 So even when a court is willing
to recognize that the defense might be applicable, it looks for ways to
avoid applying it. On the other hand, other courts bend over back-
wards to accommodate the defense. In Frye v. Bowman, Heintz, Bos-
cia & Vician, P.C.,416 the court was intrigued by the Ninth Circuit's
language in Baker v. G. C. Services Corp., that a mistake of law was
"'insufficient by itself to raise the bona fide error defense."' 4 1 7 The
Frye court took this to mean that a debt collector could benefit from
411. 307 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2002).
412. 84 F.3d 222, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1996). The attorney must review the consumer's
file, decide on the propriety of sending a delinquency letter, and avoid the mass
production of the collection letter. See id.
413. 307 F.3d at 642.
414. Household Credit Services was liable as a collector because it gave the debtor the
false impression that a third party was involved in collecting the debt. Id. at 639
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000)). Household did not succeed with its bona fide
error defense, because its actions were in "plain contravention" of the Avila deci-
sion. Nielsen, 307 F.3d at 641.
415. 124 F.3d at 832.
416. 193 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
417. Id. at 1085 (quoting Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir.
1982)).
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the defense under certain circumstances.418 In Frye the collector's
mistake was in using a defective summons form that was identical to
that used by various court clerks within the state. 4 19 The collector's
mistaken use of that form could be traced to the debt collector's depen-
dence on the validity of the clerks' form. The mistake was not the
collector's alone, but carried the tacit approval of state officials.420
The Frye court was keen to treat this reliance on officialdom as the
circumstances under which it could uphold the collector's bona fide
error defense.42 1 The collector's mistake did not stand by itself, and
therefore the Baker requirement seemed to be fulfilled. The Frye
court was not alone in attributing some importance to the "by itself'
phraseology of the Baker court.
The court in Watkins v. Peterson Enterprises422 took the same ap-
proach when the collector used unfair means to collect debts through
court-ordered pay orders, instead of obtaining judgments against the
garnishees. The Watkins court distinguished Baker on the ground
that the collector's practices in the latter case had received no official
approval. 4 23 The Frye and Watkins courts went behind the collectors'
mistakes to examine the collectors' reliance on some official prac-
tice. 424 But it is questionable whether a court should assess the reli-
ance factor without first deciding whether the statute covers a
mistake of law. A court should reach the reliance element only if it is
grappling with the question whether the collector had procedures in
place to avoid the error in dispute.425 It is possible that some courts
protect a mistake of law because the collector has relied on advice or
pronouncements of others who should know the statutory require-
ments. When the collector in Kort v. Diversified Collection Services,
Inc.426 relied on a form identical to one authorized by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education ("DOE") for the collection of student loans, the
court was persuaded to accept the bona fide error defense, because the
collector had followed the "procedures of the very administrative
agency Congress empowered to implement the [FDCPA]."427 The
court found it difficult to imagine how the debt collector could have
more reasonably adopted a procedure to avoid legal error than the col-
418. Id. at 1085-86.
419. See id. at 1087.
420. Id.
421. See id.
422. 57 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
423. See id. at 1107.
424. See Frye, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; Watkins, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
425. The collector must show that "the violation was not intentional and resulted from
a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adopted to avoid any such error." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2000).
426. 270 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2003), affd on other grounds, No. 04-1074, 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 306 (7th Cir. Jan. 10, 2005).
427. Id. at 1026.
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lector's deference to the relevant federal agency. 4 28 The court did not
really say why it thought that the statute should cover mistakes of
law, but decided instead that the debt collector would be protected in
this case, because it had satisfied the procedural requirement of hav-
ing a preventive mechanism in place to avoid any violations.429 The
court was not even sure that the DOE's language, upon which the col-
lector relied, was a violation.43 0 Thus, there might not have been any
mistake at all in the collector's use of a collection form that resembled
the DOE version.
Whatever the error, the collector must still show that the violation
was unintentional. It is a question of determining whether the collec-
tor will still be protected if it intended to do the act that results in the
violation, even though it did not intend to commit the violation itself.
In Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc.43 1 the Sixth Circuit made it
clear that the debt collector must show only that "the violation was
unintentional, not that the [act] itself was unintentional."432 This ap-
proach makes sense in the context of the FDCPA; otherwise the de-
fense could hardly be available when the collector takes an action that
later turns out to be wrong because of some mistake in the process.
43 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The FDCPA has been in existence since 1977. There is little doubt
that it has given consumers an effective remedy for collection viola-
tions. Nevertheless, there are certain parts of the FDCPA that con-
tinue to pose problems for collectors. Among them is the requirement
that a debt collector must send the consumer a written notice, within
five days after it first contacts the consumer, that the collector will
obtain verification of the debt if the consumer disputes the debt within
thirty days.4 3 4 There is nothing wrong in principle with this require-
ment, but it leaves the collector in a quandary about this mandate.
The problem is that the statute does not put any brakes on the collec-
tor's activities during the thirty-day period, unless the debtor disputes
428. See id.
429. See id.
430. The court made the point: "Further, because this court has not reached the ques-
tion of whether the form letter drafted by DOE was illegal under the FDCPA, it is
not clear that the 'error' here involved any mistake at all, let alone an unreasona-
ble one." Id.
431. 135 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1998).
432. Id. at 402.
433. See Caputo v. Profl Recovery Servs., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Kan. 2003);
Frye v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Ind.
2002). But see Shapiro v. Haenn, 222 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Me. 2002) (Debt collec-
tors are liable if they perform any intentional act that results in a violation, re-
gardless of fault.).
434. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2000).
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the debt and, therefore, the collector may continue its collection frenzy
without worrying too much about the consumer's understanding of the
dispute mechanism.435 There is an inevitable conflict, therefore, be-
tween the collector's harsh collection message and the collector's con-
veyance of the consumer's statutory right to dispute the debt. Many
collectors try their best to do the right thing, but they are careful to
devise a strategy that ensures the consumer's concentration on the
claim, rather than on the possibility of seeking more information
about it.436 The collection letter becomes the communiqu6 in which
the collector makes its point that it expects payment, while routinely
letting the consumer know about the right to dispute the debt.
The FTC continues to raise concerns about the standard for clarity
in the validation notice. It noted in its 2004 annual report that some
collectors take advantage of the lack of any standard by obscuring the
validation notice. 4 37 Courts have not been bashful in recognizing the
contradiction and overshadowing that result from the collectors' inge-
nuity.438 The FTC suggests that Congress should amend the FDCPA
to require that the validation notice be clear and conspicuous. 43 9 It
observes that the notice should be "'readily noticeable, readable and
comprehensible to the ordinary consumer,"' and be guided by various
factors such as "size, shade, contrast, prominence and location."440
435. See id. § 1692g(b); see also Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1054
(6th Cir. 1999); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997); FTC Staff
Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,109 (Dec. 13, 1988); 2004 FTC ANN. REP,
supra note 167, at 13; FTC Advisory Opinion, supra note 399.
436. See, e.g., Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003) (The
front of the collection letter gave the consumer various options to check, but the
validation notice was on the back.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 823 (2003); Peter v. GC
Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (The collection language appeared
on the front of the letter, whereas the validation notice was on the back.); John-
son v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1999) (The collection letter
requested prompt payment and asked the debtor to call the collector's office im-
mediately.); United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996)
(The validation notice was placed on the back of the collection letter, while the
collection language was on the front of the letter in larger type.).
437. See 2004 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 167, at 11.
438. See United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996); Miller v.
Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. S. Or.
Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989); Macarz v. Transworld Sys., Inc.,
26 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 1998).
439. See 2004 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 167, at 12.
440. Id. The FTC's annual report cited two cases where the FTC applied the "clear
and conspicuous" standard. See id. n.17 (citing Palm, Inc., No. C-4044, 2002 FTC
LEXIS 17, at *11-12 (Apr. 17, 2002) (consent order); Gateway Inc., No. 992-3276,
2001 FTC LEXIS 84, at *39-40 (May 15, 2001) (consent order)); The Palm deci-
sion defined "clearly and conspicuously" in the context of an advertisement
through an electronic medium, an advertisement in print, and an advertisement
on a product label. With respect to the last two, the important element was that
the disclosure had to be in a type size and location "sufficiently noticeable for an
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There is no quarrel with the idea of making the validation notice
clear and conspicuous. However, there is no guaranty that there will
be any agreement about whether the various types of collection letters
will meet the suggested standard. How would a definition relating to
shade and contrast of the validation notice ever alleviate the problems
inherent in the current statutory formulation? The answer may be to
allow the collector to give the bare essentials of the debt (lender's
name and amount of debt) in the first communication and include
therewith the validation notice.441 This initial communication should
not include any threats or time limits for payment, thus giving the
consumer ample opportunity to concentrate on his right to seek verifi-
cation if there is the slightest doubt about the collector's claim. Once
the verification period has expired (and it need not be too long), the
collector can then revert to its pressure tactics, free from any potential
conflict that might otherwise exist if the validation notice was compet-
ing for attention with the collection language in the same communica-
tion. The collector would not then have to worry about the size and
shade of the validation notice, and courts would not have to decide
whether the collector has obscured the notice by printing it on a non-
contrasting background and color.44 2
ordinary consumer to read and comprehend it." Palm, 2002 FTC LEXIS 17, at
*12.
441. This is not to say that one should not be concerned about clarity and conspicuous-
ness. But the initial communication should remove the temptation for the collec-
tor to give greater emphasis to its claim than to the validation notice. The
mission can be accomplished by restricting the collector to the bare details of the
claim in the initial communication.
442. An example of this persistent conflict can be found in Miller v. Payco-General
Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991), where the collector went all out to
make its point. The court set the stage as follows:
Across the top of the one page form is the title, "DEMAND FOR PAY-
MENT," in large, red, boldface type. After the title follows information
as to the creditor, the amount owed, and Payco's address. In the middle
of the page, again in large, red, boldface type, is the statement, "THIS IS
A DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE FULL PAYMENT OF YOUR DEBT."
That statement is followed by these sentences in black boldface type:
YOUR SERIOUSLY PAST DUE ACCOUNT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO US
FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION. YOU HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO PAY
YOUR DEBT, BUT YOU HAVE NOT. IF THERE IS A VALID REASON,
PHONE US AT [telephone number] TODAY. IF NOT, PAY US-NOW.
The bottom third of the document is almost completely filled by the sin-
gle word, "NOW," in white letters nearly two inches tall against a red
background.
At the very bottom of the page, in the smallest type to appear on the
form (letters one-eighth of an inch high), is the statement, "NOTICE:
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION." The notice
is printed in white against a red background. On the reverse of the docu-
ment are four paragraphs printed in gray ink. The last three
paragraphs contain the validation notice-that is, statements required
by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) that inform the con-
sumer how to obtain verification of the debt.
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The FTC also wants Congress to clarify the law by expressly per-
mitting a collector to continue with its collection activity during the
thirty-day period for disputing the debt.443 Quite frankly, the FTC
should not encourage this congressional clarification, but should
strive instead for the kind of separation previously suggested between
the validation notice and the collection notice. The problems that
have arisen in this context deal essentially with this pressure on the
collector to make its case in a serious and demanding manner, with
time limits and threats thrown in for good measure. 44 4 Somewhere
else on the collection page, the collector manages to slip in the pre-
scribed statutory language for the consumer's benefit. In many cases,
the collector is not very keen about explaining how the two items fit
together.445 If the consumer pays too much attention to the validation
notice, she may delay the collection process and the collector will be
temporarily stymied in its mission to collect the debt. The statute
should aim to remove the collector's conflict and to give the consumer
reasonable time to enjoy the benefit of disputing the debt if she wants
to do so. If the consumer remains mute, then the collector can resume
its collection efforts after expiration of the dispute period, unfettered
by the statutory validation language.
It is possible for the FTC to alleviate some of the problems in this
area by issuing model collection letters from time to time.44 6 There
are model forms in Regulation Z447 and Regulation B448 that are ex-
tremely helpful to lenders in complying with those regulations. There
is no reason why the FTC cannot adopt a similar device for the
FDCPA. A suitable amendment to the Act would authorize the FTC to
promulgate those model letters, thus providing a safe harbor to collec-
Id. at 483.
443. See 2004 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 167, at 13.
444. See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (The collection language
contradicted validation notice on back of letter, because it stated that the collec-
tor would not post the collection to the consumer's file if the consumer wished to
pay the claim in ten days.); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991) (A
threat to sue if consumer did not pay in ten days rendered validation notice inef-
fective.); Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (An
implicit threat to ruin consumer's credit record within ten days contradicted con-
sumer's validation rights.); Desantis v. Roz-Ber, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 244
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (The collector's demand for "IMMEDIATE ATTENTION" and a
threat that the consumer would not receive cooperation if he did not pay in full or
call to make arrangements overshadowed the consumer's right to dispute the
debt.).
445. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. Heibl,
128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997); Miller, 943 F.2d 482.
446. See 2004 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 167, at 15.
447. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, apps. G, H (2004).
448. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, apps. B, C (2004).
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tors that choose to use them.44 9 The model letters should take into
account the two-notice approach, with a view to removing the incen-
tive for collectors to contradict and overshadow the validation notice.
Congress should also take immediate steps to clarify whether the
bona fide error defense can be used for mistakes of law. After all, it
went to the trouble of specifically excluding such mistakes in the
Truth in Lending context when it amended the statute in 1980,450 but
it left untouched the bona fide error defense language in the FDCPA.
It is no wonder that some courts are confused about what Congress
intended by its failure to act in the debt collection context. The Truth
in Lending simplification effort followed enactment of the FDCPA in
1977, but Congress did not make any changes to the latter statute.
Most courts have continued to deny mistakes of law as a defense fol-
lowing the Truth in Lending trend.4 51 They may feel justified in doing
so because of the judicial interpretation of the pre-1980 Truth in Lend-
ing language, which did not make any specific reference to mistakes of
law. The time is ripe, nevertheless, for an expression of congressional
confidence in the judicial interpretation of the FDCPA provision.
449. The FTC suggests an amendment that would add the following language at the
end of § 16921(d):
"except that the Commission shall be authorized to promulgate by regu-
lation, under Section 553 of Title 5, United States Code, model collection
letters or forms for those debt collectors who choose to use them. If a
debt collector adheres precisely to one of these models in creating a col-
lection letter, the collection letter shall be deemed to be in compliance
with [the FDCPA]."
2004 FTC ANN. REP., supra note 167, at 15.
450. See Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615,
94 Stat. 168, 180-81 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000)).
451. See Picht v. Jon R. Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2001); Pipiles v. Credit
Bureau, Inc., 886 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1989); Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc.,
728 F.2d 1037 (8th Cir. 1984); Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir.
1982); Wilkerson v. Bowman, 200 F.R.D. 605 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Booth v. Collection
Experts, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Sibley v. FirstCollect, Inc., 913
F. Supp. 469 (M.D. La. 1995); Martinez v. Albuquerque Collection Servs., Inc.,
867 F. Supp. 1495 (D. N.M. 1994). But see Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th
Cir. 2002); Frye v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1070
(S.D. Ind. 2002); Taylor v. Luper, Sheriff & Niedenthal Co., 74 F. Supp: 2d 761
(S.D. Ohio 1999).
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